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INTRODUCTION
Treaties, like all regulatory institutions, are purposive. Their primary
aim is to produce effects on behavior that would not otherwise have
occurred. What causes some treaties to achieve their purposes while others
do not is a central question - perhaps the central question - in
* Acting Professor, UCLA Law School and UCLA Institute of the Environment.
A.B., Duke University; Ph.D, UC San Diego; J.D., Harvard Law School.
raustiala@law.ucla.edu. I am thankful to Jody Freeman and Richard Steinberg for very
helpful comments on an earlier draft, to David G. Victor for a longstanding collaboration
on some of the research discussed within, and to Kara Persson of UCLA Law School and
Kate Miles of NYU Law School for able research assistance. I also thank the students
and faculty at Case Western Reserve Law School for inviting me to participate in this
symposium series. This article is dedicated to the late Abe Chayes, who taught me and so
many others so much about how international law really works.
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international cooperation today, for without an understanding of
effectiveness we cannot design useful, productive institutions.
Legal rules and institutions affect behavior through a number of causal
pathways.' Compliance, the focus of this symposium, is typically an
important aspect of the production of institutional effectiveness, but not the
only aspect. In this article, I analyze the often complex relationship
between compliance, understood as conformity between behavior and a
legal rule or standard, and effectiveness, understood as the degree to which
a legal rule or standard induces desired changes in behavior.2 I argue in the
context of international regulatory cooperation that the prevailing analytical
focus on compliance is often misplaced and even counterproductive.
Contrary to the (often implicit) assumption in many studies of treaty
compliance, low levels of compliance are not inherently an indication of
low effectiveness. Indeed, as I will describe, high levels of compliance
may signal low effectiveness. A more fruitful analytic focus is the causal
impact of legal rules on behavior and the linkages between these causal
connections and compliance.
In the body of this article, I make four more specific claims about
compliance and effectiveness in international regulatory cooperation. While
the claims concern the sources of treaty effectiveness, in each I endeavor to
show how compliance and effectiveness interact. Collectively, these claims
also illustrate the myriad and sometimes unexpected ways international law
influences behavior. In making these claims, I draw mainly on recent
research on environmental treaties and attempt to connect this research to
this symposium's other focus: international intellectual property law. While
international intellectual property law and international environmental law
have little in common,3 I proceed from the supposition that at least some of
1 See, e.g., Oran R. Young & Marc A. Levy (with the assistance of Gail Osherenko),
The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes, in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES: CAUSAL CONNECTIONS AND BEHAVIORAL
MECHANISMS 1 (Oran R. Young ed., 1999) (discussing effectiveness in the international
context); Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998)
(discussing the regulation of behavior in the domestic context).
2 See infra Part II for definitions of these terms.
3 There are areas of overlap between the two fields. The 1992 Convention on
Biological Diversity, for example, seeks to protect the genetic resources that are often at
the heart of agricultural, biotechnological, and pharmaceutical innovations. See
Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, I.L.M. 818. The treatment of
intellectual property rights in the Convention was a concern of the U.S. government
(which has signed but not ratified the treaty) because it was seen as potentially
undermining or "hollowing out" the substantive provisions in the Trade-Related
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, negotiated as part of the Uruguay
Round of multilateral trade negotiations. See infra note 9. Similarly, many advocates
from the developing world and indigenous communities see the extension of intellectual
property through TRIPS as destructive of conservation and development efforts and
antithetical to social values in those communities. See generally Kal Raustiala & David
G. Victor, Biodiversity Since Rio: The Future of the Convention on Biological Diversity,
ENVIRONMENT, May 1996, at 17 (discussing the biological diversity treaty); Vincente
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what drives compliance with international regulatory commitments is
independent of the precise issues involved, and that where the nature of
issues does matter through careful comparative analysis we may draw
useful lessons for law and policy.
My approach is interdisciplinary. While international lawyers have
long been concerned with treaty compliance,4 political scientists have
begun to examine treaty compliance as well.5 This latter line of research
focuses on the causality of state behavior and the explicit analysis of
effectiveness, though compliance is often an important variable. Research
in political science also employs a broad perspective, starting with actor
behavior and looking not only at international legal obligations but also at
the wider array of norms and practices that may shape behavior vis-k-vis
international treaties - what political scientists term an "international
Sdnchez, The Convention on Biological Diversity: Negotiation and Contents, in
BIODIPLOMACY: GENETIC RESOURCES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Vicente Sdnchez
& Calestous Juma eds., 1994). For treatment of the plant genetic resources dimension,
see David S. Tilford, Saving the Blueprints: The International Legal Regime for Plant
Resources, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 373 (1998), Rebecca L. Margulies, Note,
Protecting Biodiversity: Recognizing International Intellectual Property Rights in Plant
Genetic Resources, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 322 (1993), and SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE
USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES (Jack R. Kloppenburg, Jr. ed., 1988).
On the diplomacy of TRIPS, see MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL
COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1998) and Susan K. Sell,
Intellectual Property Protection and Antitrust in the Developing World: Crisis,
Coercion, and Choice, 49 INT'L ORG. 315, 321-22 (1995).
4 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE (2d ed. 1979). But see Edith
Brown Weiss, Understanding Compliance with International Environmental
Agreements: The Baker's Dozen Myths, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1555, 1555 (1999) (stating
that "[u]ntil recently, little attention has been given to whether states and other actors
comply with the agreements they negotiate.").
s For recent studies of compliance with international agreements from across the two
disciplines, see ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson
eds., 1998), A Symposium on Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness, 19 MICH. J.
OF INT'L L. 303 (1998), Beth A. Simmons, Compliance with International Agreements 1
ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 75 (1998), Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International
Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599 (1997); Gtinther Handl, Compliance Control Mechanisms
and International Environmental Obligations, 5 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 29 (1997),
George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News about
Cooperation, 50 INT'L ORG. 379 (1996), Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Implementation,
Enforcement, and Compliance with International Environmental Agreements -
Practical Suggestions in Light of the World Bank's Experience, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REv. 37 (1996), IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
(James Cameron et al. eds., 1996), ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE
NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS
(1995), RONALD B. MITCHELL, INTENTIONAL OIL POLLUTION AT SEA: ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY AND TREATY COMPLIANCE (1994), and Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler
Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175 (1993).
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regime' 6 and what legal scholars might study under the rubric of social
norms, social meaning, and sometimes as customary international law.7 The
emerging multidisciplinary dialogue has enriched our understanding of the
interplay between law, politics, and cooperation in international affairs, and
I employ insights from both disciplines frequently.8
6 The utility of the international regime concept is that it comprises a fuller range of
behaviors and behavioral influences, and highlights legal as well as extralegal aspects of
cooperation. An international regime may contain several distinct treaties, or no treaty at
all. While the notion of norms and practices shares much with customary international
law, it is again broader, because it dispenses with the opinio juris requirement (though it
sometimes appears that opinio juris has also been discarded by many jurists and theorists
in international law - and so has the state practice requirement). On the latter, see
Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law,
3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 108-12 (1995). On customary international law, see
generally Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International
Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999) (using game theory to explain how customary
international law arises), MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES:
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999); Louis
HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 29-40 (1995), and ANTHONY
D'AMATo, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971). For a recent
overview of the expansive literature within political science on international regimes, see
generally ANDREAS HASENCLEVER ET AL., THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (1997).
See INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) and ROBERT 0. KEOHANE,
AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY
(1984) for the seminal treatments of international regimes.
7 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 1; Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An
Economic Approach 87 AM. ECON. REV. 365 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms
and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of
Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of
Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 133 (1996); Symposium, Law, Economics & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643
(1996). See generally Weiss, supra note 4, at 1555-58 (providing references on
customary law).
8 The interdisciplinary literature is rapidly growing. The majority of this work looks
to international relations theory to inform international legal scholarship, and is done by
international lawyers (some of whom, such as Anne-Marie Slaughter and Richard
Steinberg, are also political scientists). See, e.g., Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 6;
Symposium on Method in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 291, 291-423 (1999);
Byers, supra note 6; Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International
Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
367 (1998); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal
International Organizations, 42 J. Conflict Resol. 3 (1998); Kal Raustiala, States, NGOs,
and International Environmental Institutions, 41 INT'L STUD. Q. 719 (1997); Richard H.
Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Regional
Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 231 (1997); John K. Setear,
Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations Theory: The
Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State
Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REv. 1 (1997); John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on
Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 139 (1996); Robert J. Beck, International Law and International Relations:
[Vol. 32:387
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The specific claims made in this article pertain to international law.
But while international law is rapidly growing and increasingly significant
for other areas of legal inquiry, and hence arguments about the causality of
international law increasingly important, the conceptual and analytical
framework I present in Part HI of this article for understanding compliance,
implementation, and effectiveness is applicable more generally. In Part I,
I present a broad-gauged typology of theories of state behavior vis-A.-vis
international commitments, and link these theories to questions of
compliance and effectiveness. In Part IV, I then discuss recent research on
international environmental cooperation that addresses compliance and
effectiveness in important and provocative ways. Part V tenders some brief
comments on the import of the preceding for the leading intellectual
property treaty, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property 9, commonly known as TRIPS. Part VI concludes by underscoring
the centrality of a behavioral approach to international institutions and of a
more nuanced appreciation of the role of compliance in international law
and world politics.
11. COMPLIANCE, IMPLEMENTATION, AND EFFECTIVENESS
Compliance generally refers to a state of conformity or identity
between an actor's behavior and specified rule.' In the international
context, compliance is often specified as "an actor's behavior that conforms
to a treaty's explicit rules."" Wile measuring or evaluating compliance with
a given international commitment is typically conceptually-straightforward
- though it may be empirically difficult - ascertaining why compliance
or noncompliance occurs is more challenging. However, this latter causal
inquiry is critical from the perspective of designing international
commitments that reliably produce compliance. Since, as I will argue,
compliance with international treaty commitments is in practice often
inadvertent, coincidental, or an artifact of the legal rule or standard chosen,
The Prospects for Interdisciplinary Collaboration, 1 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 119 (1995);
G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the
World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829 (1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley,
International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L
L. 205 (1993). For one of the earliest, if not the earliest, efforts in the recent wave of
incorporating international relations theory in the study of international law, see Kenneth
W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International
Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INTL L. 335 (1989).
9 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter
WTO Agreement], Annex IC, 33 ILM 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
1o Some compliance theorists argue that concepts of compliance vary given different
theories of international law. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance
as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345
(1998).
11 MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 30; see also ROGER FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW (1981).
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the sheer fact of compliance with a given commitment tells us little about
the utility and impact of that commitment. As a result, it offers little
guidance for the creation and adjustment of future commitments.
To do more, it is critical to distinguish compliance from two closely
related concepts: implementation and effectiveness. Distinguishing these
concepts is necessary for a satisfactory causal analysis of compliance, and
only through causal analysis can we begin to systematically understand and
improve compliance. Implementation refers to the process of putting
international commitments into practice: the passage of domestic
legislation, promulgation of regulations, creation of institutions (both
domestic and international), and enforcement of rules. 12  While
implementation can occur at the international level, such as in the physical
establishment of a secretariat created by a treaty, here I am chiefly
concerned with implementation of commitments at the national level by the
parties to a given treaty.
Implementation is a complex process about which few useful
generalities can be made. 13 However, as both a deductive and an empirical
matter, it is the case that while implementation is typically a critical step
toward compliance, compliance can occur without implementation. That is,
compliance with a legal rule can occur without any effort or action by a
government or regulated entity.14 If an international commitment matches
current practice in a given state, for instance, implementation is
unnecessary and compliance is automatic. 5 Compliance is produced in
many treaties in this manner; the international whaling treaties, for
example, contained for most of their history total whale-catch quotas set to
roughly match the demand of the whaling industry.1 6 Compliance with the
quotas of the whaling accords was nearlyperfect, but only because the legal
standard codified then-current behavior. ' Similarly, the Non-Proliferation
12 See David G. Victor et al., Introduction and Overview to THE IMPLEMENTATION
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 1 (David G. Victor et al. eds., 1998).
"3 See id. at 3.
14 Of course, implementation can occur, as it sometimes does, without resulting in
compliance. As I argue below, however, in the international arena, in which states must
affirmatively consent to treaty rules, these rules are often crafted with a wide margin of
error that aims to reliably produce compliance.
15 Even more strongly, international commitments may permit and legitimize states to
do what they want to do. As Phillip R. Trimble argues, "Contrary to the realist/idealist
view of law as a restraint on unruly governments, international law confirms much more
authority and power than it denies." Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order,
and Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811, 833 (1990).
16 David G. Victor, Whale Sausage: Why the Whaling Regime Does Not Need Fixing,
in TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE WHALING REGIME 4 (Robert Freidheim ed., forthcoming).
17 Recently evidence has arisen that in the case of the Soviet Union the quotas may
have been substantially exceeded; the Soviets systematically falsfied their data on whale
catches in order to appear in compliance with the legal rule. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 1021 (1998); David Caron, Current
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Treaty obliges many states to do what they are currently doing: not use or
develop nuclear weapons.18 Compliance exists, but the causal link between
it and the legal rule of interest is very weak. The same phenomenon occurs
in domestic law: while the law may be best designed for the "bad man," 19
most individuals would not commit murder were it legal, and the legal
status of the prohibition often has only a marginal impact on behavior.20
Compliance can also occur for reasons entirely exogenous to the legal
process: economic collapse in the states of the former Soviet Union, for
example, has produced perfect, but coincidental, compliance with many
environmental treaties. 21 Again, no causally-related implementation of the
treaties occurred. Instead, as economic output has dropped, so has the
associated pollution and waste discharges. 22 This illustrates the danger of a
"snapshot" approach to compliance; the economies of the former Soviet
states will almost certainly improve in the future, and without further
changes in production processes along with that improvement will likely
come noncompliance with many environmental commitments. This
example also suggests that attention to the empirics of implementation
processes can shed light on the real impact of treaties and commitments.
These examples help distinguish implementation and compliance, but
they also illustrate the critical distinction between compliance with an
international obligation and the effectiveness of that obligation.
Effectiveness is a concept that can be defined in varying ways: as the
degree to which a given rule induces changes in behavior that further the
goals of the rule; the degree to which a rule improves the state of the
underlying problem; or the degree to which a rule achieves its inherent
policy objectives.23 While most common-sense notions of effectiveness
Development, The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine
Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures, 89
AMER. J. INTLL. 154, 171-72 (1995).
'8 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
729 U.N.T.S. 161.
19 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
20 Clearly law has a symbolic and expressive function that may reinforce existing
social norms, such as the norm against murder. My point is simply that if we want to
understand compliance with a legal rule, such as the prohibition on murder, we must
recognize that many rules codify social behavior and thus we cannot, without more,
causally link the rule to the observed behavior. The independent causal impact of the
legality of the rule is likely to be small, though not necessarily zero.
21 See, e.g., Alexei Roginko, Domestic Implementation of Baltic Sea Pollution
Commitments in Russia and the Baltic States, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE, supra note 12, at 575.
22 See id. at 577.
23 See Young & Levy, supra note 1, at 3-6; Victor et al., supra note 12, at 6; Robert
0. Keohane et al., The Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions, in
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 3, 7 (Peter Haas et al. eds., 1993); ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL
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relate to "solving the underlying problem," the factors that may influence
the solution to a complex international problem are myriad. In many cases
disentangling them is impossible. 24 Hence, many analysts define and assess
effectiveness in more modest terms: as observable, desired changes in
behavior. 25 This is the definition that I prefer and employ here.
Under this definition, an effective rule is not one that solves a problem,
nor one that is subjectively judged superior to alternative rules by some
external criterion, such as efficiency. An effective rule is simply a rule that
leads to observable, desired behavioral change. Effectiveness is the
measure of that change. Even when defined in this modest manner, many
international rules are not effective. The international whaling rules
described above were ineffective even in this minimal sense; they produced
almost no observable, desired changes in behavior. Compliance was very
high, but effectiveness very low. Similarly, the effectiveness of many
environmental treaties with regard to the former Soviet states is zero -
though compliance is perfect. This pattern of no or negligible effectiveness
is not uncommon in international law and, again, is sometimes present in
domestic law as well. The critical factor here is the relationship between
the stringency of the legal standard and the baseline of behavior. When the
legal standard mimics or falls below the baseline - whether intentionally
or coincidentally - compliance is high but effectiveness low.
The converse situation is also possible: rules can be effective even if
compliance with them is low. If a legal standard is quite demanding, even
widespread failure to meet it may still correlate with observable, desired
changes in behavior. Domestic environmental law in the United States, for
example, often exhibits low levels of compliance but sometimes relatively
high levels of effectiveness. 26 Many U.S. cities are non-attainment zones
GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY 142-52 (1994);
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A SURVEY OF
EXISTING LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 4-7 (Peter H. Sand ed., 1992).
24 Young and Levy write:
The most intuitively appealing sense of effectiveness centers on the degree to which a
regime eliminates or alleviates the problem that prompts its creation. Yet this
definition presents practical problems that are sometimes severe. The social systems
that are the focus of international regimes (as well as the natural systems within which
they operate) are typically complex. Longitudinal data on the evolution of these
systems, moreover, are frequently inconsistent or nonexistent. As a result, it is often
difficult to ascribe observed changes in these systems to the operation of international
regimes. The difficulties are compounded by the fact that most problems serious
enough to justify the creation of an international regime motivate actors to pursue
solutions through a variety of initiatives, including some that do not involve the
regime directly.
Young & Levy, supra note 1, at 4.
25 See id. at 4-5; Victor et al., supra note 12, at 6; Keohane et al., supra note 23, at 7.
26 See generally Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and
Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 299
(discussing the centrality of noncompliance to environmental law). Relatedly, Farber
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under the Clean Air Act and some, such as Los Angeles, have
unsuccessfully struggled for decades to be in attainment. 27 Yet air quality
throughout the United States and in particular in Los Angeles has improved,
and few would suggest that the Clean Air Act has had no positive impact
upon behavior.28 In general, rules and standards within domestic legislation
are not final targets, but rather are often starting points in an ongoing
interaction and negotiation between regulators and regulatees.29 Within this
interaction the existence of significant noncompliance is not anomalous but
anticipated, 30 and the scope and depth of noncompliance forms the basis for
much of the later negotiations. In such contexts, the existence of
noncompliance with a legal rule on its own does not indicate much about
the effectiveness of that rule.
Speed limits on freeways present a more prosaic example of
effectiveness without compliance. Speed limits are rarely complied with in
a strict sense - most traffic exceeds speed limits by a comfortable margin
but speed limits appear to dampen traffic speeds nonetheless.3 ' In
cabining some driving behavior the speed limits are effective, even if
notes that Justice Scalia, before joining the Supreme Court, suggested that some
environmental statutes "are not really meant to be universally enforced and implied that
justiciability doctrine should provide leeway for a certain degree of agency flexibility."
Id. at 312 (citing Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 894 (1983)).
27 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994). Frequently, environmental
standards are not reached and are even unreachable: Congress mandated in the Clean
Water Act, for instance, that all water pollution end by 1985. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)
(1994).
28 For example, while Los Angeles regularly exceeds EPA limits on (tropospheric)
ozone pollution, the number of days it does so has dropped markedly in the 1990s.
While in the late 1980s, 180 days a year of noncompliance was not unknown, the EPA's
1999 estimate is less than sixty days of noncompliance, about 33% of the previous level.
See Mathew L. Wald, EPA Says Smog for 1999 Has Been Bad, Not Hideous, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 1999, at A16. While many factors may be at play - and the Clean Air Act is
clearly riddled with numerous problems - it does appear to have led to appreciable air
quality improvements in many cities.
29 See generally Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative
State, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1997) (presenting a critical analysis of regulatory
negotiation); Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of
Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997); Farber, supra note 26, at 315-16. The
Environmental Protection Agency's Project XL takes this notion one step further. It has
as its goal the trading of "indulgences" to non-comply with statutory or regulatory rules
in exchange for greater performance (thus the commonly-quoted phrase, "if it isn't
illegal, it isn't XL"). See generally United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Project XL (last updated May 8, 2000) http//:www.epa.gov/ProjectXL.
30 See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233,
233 (1990).'
31 See discussion infra note 40 (discussing the case of Montana, which illustrates the
complexities of the relationship between compliance, legal standards, and social
practices or norms).
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compliance with the legal standard is very low or even non-existent. While
from an effectiveness perspective more compliance with a well-designed
standard is better, ceteris paribus - just as more compliance with speed
limits is better - rules with significant noncompliance still can be effective
if they induce desired changes in behavior that otherwise would not have
occurred.32
This statement is particularly important given the differing contexts of
international and domestic regulatory rules. Domestic statutes, such as the
Clean Air Act or regulations, such as speed limits, are created and enforced
in the context of a legal and political system in which the majority can
effectively and legitimately impose rules upon the minority. International
rules, by contrast, are the product of explicit bargains among sovereign
equals. Z With few exceptions, states are the architects of international rules
and explicit state consent the only source of legitimate power for those
rules.34 The need for consent in turn entails consensus or near-consensus
bargaining rules among the states involved in a treaty negotiation. Treaties
are thus an endogenous regulatory strategy for the governments involved:
governments initiate treaty negotiations, determine their scope, and fix the
content of international commitments collectively. 35  By doing so,
32 Exactly how legal rules operate to cabin behavior is a murky and unresolved area
of legal theory, but one with significant import. Economistic analyses see law as simply
giving rise to costs that deter certain behaviors; other theories, like that of Joseph Raz,
claim that reasons for actions can be divided in first and second orders, and that second-
order reasons, such as illegality, operate to preclude some actions even if first-order
reasons suggest them. Lawful rules can be seen as one form of second-order reasons.
See generally JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 35-47 (1975); Lewis
Kornhauser, The Normativity of Law, Manuscript Presented at the Colloquium on Law,
Philosophy, and Political Theory at NYU Law School (Sept. 23, 1999) (on file with the
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law) (discussing Raz and contrasting
economistic theories).
33 On the impact of different voting rules in the international and domestic settings,
see Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in
Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 735-42 (1998).
34 See HENKIN, supra note 6, at 26-28. Some international rules are peremptory
norms, which cannot be broken by any states regardless of consent, and some are
customary norms, which are not "consented" to explicitly but instead develop through a
tacit process. See generally id. at 29-40 (discussing the differing forms of international
rules); D'AMATO, supra note 6. States may escape emergent customary norms only by
regularly denouncing the norm, a concept known as the "persistent objector doctrine."
See also Hiram E. Chodosh, Neither Treaty Nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative
International Law, 26 TEx. INT'L L.J. 87, 114-18 (1991). For a critical discussion of
customary law, see Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 6. For a critique in the
environmental context, see Bodansky, supra note 6. For an illustration of the centrality
of state consent in international law, see David D. Caron, The International Whaling
Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional
Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 154, 166-67 (1995).
35 Other actors, such as international organizations and non-governmental
organizations, of course play a role and often are instrumental in setting the agenda of
international negotiations. But it is undeniable that governments run negotiations and
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governments also largely - though not totally - determine compliance
levels with the resulting international rules.36 Collectively setting the legal
standard at a low level that is readily met is one way governments can
ensure their compliance with international rules.37 Compliance in the
international system is thus a very different phenomenon than compliance
in a domestic legal system, with distinct antecedents and causal factors.
Because compliance levels are largely an artifact of the legal standard
employed, the significance of high or low compliance levels in any given
case is not self-evident, and especially so internationally. Louis Henkin's
famous aphorism that "almost all nations observe almost all principles of
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time'
38
was stated in support of the notion that international law is important and
effective. But that statement can be readily re-interpreted to instead support
the notion that international law is insignificant and ineffective: if
international legal rules simply mirror state behavior, compliance is perfect
but effectiveness zero. In short, evidence of compliance without more is
largely meaningless, and conclusions about compliance cannot reliably be
extrapolated from data about state behavior.
Evaluating and improving compliance instead requires data about state
behavior plus a theory and analysis of the causality of compliance, coupled
with a counterfactual analysis or, if possible, a natural experiment.
Evaluating effectiveness requires a similar analysis. Indeed, both inquiries
can be subsumed under the rubric of "analyzing the causes of state behavior
vis-h-vis an international treaty or commitment." A natural experiment is
exactly that: a situation in which many variables are held constant but one
or two change, such as when one (domestic) state or locality changes
product liability laws while others do not. Natural experiments are a rare
formally determine their ambit and resolution, even if they are aided in that process by
non-state actors. On the varied roles played by non-state actors, see Special Issue,
Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1 (1992);
MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); Raustiala, supra note 8; Jessica T.
Mathews, Power Shift, reprinted in THE AMERICAN ENCOUNTER: THE UNITED STATES
AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 515 (James F. Hoge, Jr. & Fareed Zakaria
eds., 1997); Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International
Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'LL. 183 (1997).
36 1 explore how governments determine compliance levels endogenously and the
tools that exist to improve compliance more fully below. See infra Part III.
37 This is often called the "slowest boat" phenomenon. It is true that international
rules are sometimes set at a relatively high level, but in these cases, states often refrain
from accepting those rules until they are ready and able to comply. For example, this
dynamic can be seen in the international monetary system, where governments can
choose to accept Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund Articles of Agreements.
Compliance in these cases is not caused by the existence of the rule in a direct manner,
but rather the rule acts as a goal that governments aim to meet for various reasons, such
as a desire to signal investors. See Beth Simmons, COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY AGREEMENTS, INTERNATIONAL ORG. (forthcoming, 2000).
38 HENKIN, supra note 4, at 47.
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but wonderful aid to analysis when they occur. A counterfactual analysis is
a comparison of the observed outcome and the analyst's best guess about
the likely course of events if the treaty or commitment or particular
institution had not existed. A counterfactual analysis is a thought
experiment rather than a natural experiment.39 To return to the speeding
example, the likely outcome in the absence of any speed limit is reasonable
speeds by many drivers but excessive and even extreme speeds by some.
This is in fact the outcome observed in Montana's recent experiment with a
"reasonableness" standard for daytime driving.40 Given this, speeding laws
appear (in the aggregate) to be somewhat effective: compliance is low, but
counterfactual reasoning suggests that there is probably a change in
behavior due to the law.4' By engaging in counterfactual analysis and
tracing the processes by which specific factors influence behavior, analysts
can begin to identify and disentangle the key variables that lead to
compliance with international commitments.
In sum, to speak of compliance is to be agnostic about causality:
compliance as a concept draws no causal linkage between a legal rule and
behavior, but simply identifies a conformity between the rule and behavior.
To speak of effectiveness is to speak directly of causality: to claim that a
rule is "effective" is to claim that it led to certain behaviors or outcomes,
which may or may not meet the legal standard of compliance. To be sure,
compliance is important. The central issue in a speeding infraction is the
39 See Young & Levy, supra note 1, at 18; Keohane et al., supra note 23, at 18-19;
James D. Fearon, Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science, 43
WORLD POL. 169 (1991).
40 See Robert E. King & Cass R. Sunstein, Doing Without Speed Limits, 79 B.U. L.
Rev 155 (1999) (analyzing the Montana experience). King and Sunstein note that for
most residents the revocation of the speed limit altered driving behavior little, but for
some and in particular for some tourists it led to very high speed driving. See id. at 156.
As King and Sunstein note, however, the most interesting parts of the story are in
the details. While they interpret the data to suggest that "much of driving behavior is
governed by informal norms" - a view with which I concur - they also note that many
other factors may explain observed speeds on Montana's highways, such as the often
treacherous road conditions and that drivers may be using the old speed standard (in
reality, something in the 60-65 mph range) as a focal point for behavior. See id. at 156,
163. They also note the percentage of motorists travelling above 80 mph increased from
2% to 5% (a 150% increase) in the opening months of the new law - though the
majority were out-of-state drivers, perhaps drawn to Montana by the "speed magnet."
See id. at 162-63, 191. Thus, on the one hand, the Montana experience suggests that, as
this article argues, the link between observed compliance and law qua law is often quite
weak in comparison to the role of other causal factors. See id. at 162-85. On the other, it
seems clear that the legal status and sanctions of the old speed limits had some causal
impact, and that for a small percentage of drivers this impact was quite large.
41 The "states as laboratories" argument so often heard in the law draws implicitly on
the utility of natural experiments. In the speeding example, we in fact had somewhat of
a natural experiment in the United States in that states in the 1990s adopted many
different limits, with Montana setting only a standard of reasonableness during the
daytime. See generally id. (discussing the Montana experience).
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relationship between the observed speed and the legal limit, a question of
compliance.42 But as the experience of Montana suggests, the law's
effectiveness in controlling speeding cannot simply be inferred from data
about compliance with speed limits. If we seek to understand how and
why legal rules or standards operate as they do and when they are effective,
we must self-consciously analyze the underlying sources of behavior and
their relationship to the legal rule or standard. Indices of compliance,
without more, are helpful but insufficient.
HI. CAUSAL THEORIES OF STATE BEHAVIOR
The analysis in the preceding Part is applicable, with minor variations,
to the study of any legal rule or standard. However, the focus of this
symposium is compliance with international rules, and hence the behavior
of interest is that of states. The study of why states behave as they do is
central to the discipline of international relations. Political scientists have
developed a wide range of often sophisticated theories that are applicable to
questions of treaty compliance and effectiveness. Below I categorize and
introduce the main theories of state behavior vis- -vis international
commitments under three headings: rationalist or utilitarian state-actor
theories; norm-driven or sociological theories; and liberal or domestic
institutional theories. While these categories are broad, and the lines
between them not always sharp or mutually exclusive, the categories
capture the major distinctions in existing theories in a heuristically-useful
way.
Each family of theories identifies a distinctive set of variables as the
critical causal factors that explain variation in state behavior.44 In brief,
compass, rationalist or utilitarian theories are economistic in nature. They
treat states as rational, strategic, interdependent choice-making actors and
examine the underlying structure of problems and incentives in a particular
area of cooperation. Norm-driven theories of state behavior stress the role
of socialization, the social construction of state interests (and preferences),
and the internalization of norms within states. Liberal theories, like
rationalist theories, are epistemologically rationalist in orientation, but
break down the state into its component parts and emphasize the centrality
of domestic politics and institutions to explanations of variation in state
behavior.
42 Even there, and more generally in the criminal law, however, there is a concern
with causality: an affirmative defense of justification is a causal claim about
noncompliance with a legal rule that, if accepted, may exonerate or mitigate the
defendant's guilt. An excuse claim is similarly a claim about the causality of
noncompliance.
43 King & Sunstein, supra note 40, at 156.
44 This is not to imply that there are extant analyses of compliance self-consciously
employing each of these theoretical traditions. Rather, I have taken the main branches of
international relations theory and applied them to the compliance question, which is
really a subset of a broader question these theories do address: what are the sources of
state behavior in international affairs?
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A. Rationalist Theories
Rationalist theories of international relations emphasize the structure
of interests, actors, power, and incentives at play in a particular issue.
Perhaps the most basic variables in rationalist theories are comprised by
what is sometimes termed "problem structure." One central aspect of
problem structure draws on basic non-cooperative game theory,4' which
illustrates the very different incentives to comply with collective rules that
exist in roblems characterized by coordination games or by collaboration
games. Coordination games refer to situations in which actors benefit
from the existence of a shared standard: the paradigmatic case is the rule
that one drives on the right (or the left) side of the road, but not both. Once
such a rule is established the incentive to deviate is weak or non-existent;
compliance is an equilibrium.47 Conversely, in collaboration games mixed
motives for cooperation exist. While all actors collectively are better off if
they all comply, noncompliance can produce benefits for individual parties.
Here the paradigmatic case is the (perhaps-overused) prisoner's dilemma,48
in which the incentives not to comply are strong and the equilibrium
outcome is mutual noncompliance. 49 These different problem structures
correspond to different real world contexts. Rules governing international
aviation, for example, are largely coordination games and hence
compliance should be, and empirically is, fairly high ° Rules for many
45 For introductions to game theory in the international context, see ARTHUR A.
STEIN, WHY NATIONS COOPERATE: CIRCUMSTANCE AND CHOICE IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (1990) or JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS
(1994). For a classic treatment, see THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT
(1960). For a modern and technical overview, see ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND
INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY (2nd ed. 1994).
46 Games of deadlock are logically excluded in the context of this article, which
addresses cooperation achieved through explicit agreements such as treaties (and thus
treats situations in which states have an underlying interest in resolving a collective
action problem).
47 There are often major distributional issues in coordination games, however. These
create incentives to shift the equilibrium solution, if the state is powerful enough to do
so. See Steven D. Krasner, Global Communications and National Power: Life on the
Pareto Frontier, in NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 234
(David A. Baldwin ed., 1993) (discussing the centrality of power and distributional
issues in regulatory cooperation).
48 The prisoner's dilemma is a story in which two prisoners, in separate rooms and
unable to communicate, have the choice of confessing or maintaining silence. If each
maintains silence they will only receive a short sentence, but if one cooperates with the
police she goes free and her partner receives a long sentence. The equilibrium outcome is
that each cooperates with the police, producing a collectively sub-optimal outcome. The
outcome depends on the absence of enforceable agreements between the prisoners and
limited information about each other's actions.
49 Under certain conditions, such as indefinite or unknown iteration, cooperation can
be sustained in what is otherwise a prisoner's dilemma game.
50 Many customary international law norms can be understood as coordination games
in which equilibria define the norm. Cf Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 6, at 1127-28.
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international trade issues are largely collaboration games5' and compliance
is lower, ceteris paribus.52
The concept of problem structure comprises more than this basic
dichotomy between coordination and collaboration, though the dichotomy
is important and often overlooked.53  Some problems are marked by
reciprocal actions that can, either through "tit for tat," specific reciprocity
or more general, diffuse reciprocity, sustain cooperation and induce
compliance with commitments over time, even in collaboration game
situations. 54 Systematic tariff reductions in trade accords, for example,
provide reciprocal benefits to states that can effectively, if imperfectly,
promote compliance and that can be withdrawn in the event of
noncompliance by another state. While many treaties involve reciprocal
obligations, the cooperative benefits are not necessarily reciprocal in this
sense and the attendant politics very different. Most environmental treaties
are not reciprocal in this sense;56 similarly, the violation of human rights
s From a pure neoliberal economic perspective, one can argue that international trade
is not a collaboration game; each state is better off as a free trader regardless of what
other states do. Politically, that view is not widely accepted, however, and the structure
and history of the GATT attest to the view that international trade is a collaboration
game. See generally RYAN, supra note 3, at 67-89 (discussing U.S. trade diplomacy). For
international intellectual property, a similar argument can be made: while it is narrowly
rational to afford little intellectual property protection and free-ride on the innovation of
others, many states may also argue that their developing status makes low levels of
intellectual property protection rational from a development perspective. Other analysts
suggest that low levels of protection are economically counterproductive over time
because they deter investment. See id. at 152-53. Regardless of the empirical veracity of
these differing claims, the effective structure of the game is collaboration: many states
would rather free-ride, and that is why TRIPS was folded in the GATT in the first place,
rather than pursued through a forum such as the World Intellectual Property
Organization. See id. at 91-139.
52 Alternatively, compliance requires other strategies, such as the development of a
system of sanctions or formalized dispute resolution, such as we see in the Dispute
Settlement Understanding of the WTO. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 15, 1993, WTO Agreement, supra note 9,
Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994).
53 See e.g., Robert 0. Keohane, Commentary, When Does International Law Come
Home? 35 HOUSTON L. REv. 699, 702-09 (1998).
54 See ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984) (discussing reciprocity as a source of sustained
cooperation); ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 57-60 (1990). The
distinction between specific and diffuse reciprocity is largely temporal: in diffuse
settings acts may "balance" over time, even if at any specific time one party may "owe!'
the other quite a bit. Specific reciprocity is pure tit-for-tat: one' act for another. See
KEOHANE, supra, at 128-3 1; AXELROD, supra, at 57-60.
55 On the precise nature of such an enforcement dynamic in the GATT, see GEORGE
W. DoWNs & DAVID M. ROCKE, OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION?: DOMESTIC UNCERTAINTY AND
INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 76-100 (1995).
56 For an argument that the underlying dynamic of human rights treaties is the
promotion of external barriers to ex post policy shifts rather than reciprocity in the
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commitments by one state cannot be effectively deterred by the threat of
violations by another state, nor is this strategy likely to be pursued as an
empirical matter.57
The breadth of the underlying regulatory problem can also impact
compliance. Problems that require the cooperation of only a few states
("minilateralism") 58 may eliminate or dampen the public goods nature of
enforcement efforts and thus enjoy higher levels of compliance than
comparable multilateral agreements. Some relevant behaviors are more
transparent, and hence more capable of being monitored, than others, again
improving compliance. 59 Transparency is linked to a central variable in
many rationalist explanations of compliance: reputational concerns.
Governments may desire a reputation for law-abidingness generally, or they
may be concerned with reputation with regard to particular legal
commitments only. Where the credibility of commitments is important to
governments, compliance with existing commitments may be understood as
a means to enhance and signal current and future credibility. 60
GATT sense, see Andrew Moravcsik, Explaining the Emergence of Human Rights
Regimes: Liberal Democracy and Political Uncertainty in Postwar Europe, (unpublished
manuscript presented at NYU Law School, Sept. 1999).
57 The analogue in environmental treaties is, in the case of a commons problem like
ozone depletion, more pollution in exchange for noncompliance with pollution
abatement rules. For upstream-downstream problems, like acid deposition between the
United States and Canada (in which the vast majority flows from the United States to
Canada) there is no real analogue because obligations and impacts are not reciprocal.
But even for more purely commons problems, like ozone depletion, the reciprocity
dynamic is much weaker than in the trade context--even though from a pure trade theory
perspective the suspension of benefits is costly for the suspending state, and thus the
examples very similar--because the politics of trade and of environment are very
different. In the environmental context, actors in Party B concerned about
noncompliance by Party A, because they are typically concerned about the environment
as a whole, are unlikely to seek noncompliance by Party B as a compliance-inducing
tool. That move is common, even ubiquitous in the trade context, and is explicitly
permitted by the WTO. See Karen D. Lee & Silke von Lewinski, The Settlement of
International Disputes in the Field of Intellectual Property, in FROM GATT TO TRIPS -
THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 278,
303 (ICC Studies vol. 18, Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996). Trade
obligations are generally viewed (at least explicitly) as reciprocal concessions, not as
efforts to address a shared problem.
58 See, e.g., Miles Kahler, Cooperation with Small and Large Numbers, 46 INT'L
ORG. 681 (1992) (discussing the diminishing role of minilateral leadership by the great
powers).
59 See Ronald B. Mitchell, Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in
International Regimes, 42 INT'L STUD. Q. 1, 109, 122-23 (1998).
60 There is a substantial literature on credibility, much of which is tangential to
compliance concerns in that it focused on other means to create credibility. See, e.g.,
Lisa L. Martin, Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions,
45 WORLD POL. 406 (1993).
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Exogenous changes in relative prices can change the cost and benefits
of compliance-related behavior, as well as the ability of states to monitor
behavior.6 1 Concerns about relative gains among states may discourage
compliance. 62  The regulatory scope and complexity of the underlying
problem can influence the capacity to comply and hence the likelihood of
compliance. For example, compliance with the current moratorium on
whaling under the International Whaling Convention, 63 which requires little
to no action by most states, should, ceteris paribus, be higher than
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on
Climate Change,6" which will, should it come into force, require pervasive
and costly domestic regulatory action.65 Collectively, these examples
illustrate that some problems are more "malign" than others, and
correspondingly harder to address.66  Compliance levels should be
correspondingly lower.
Problem structure, while centrally important to observed compliance
levels, is not the whole story in rationalist analysis. Treaties marry a
problem to a solution. Some aspects of problem structure, such as the
number of relevant parties, are themselves endogenous to the chosen
solution. The structure of the chosen solution - the rules, standards, and
institutions created by a treaty - is centrally important and is the primary,
and often the only, focus of legal analyses of compliance with international
agreements. What I term "solution structure" comprises the specific
institutional design choices of a treaty, such as the nature and content of the
primary rules of behavior, the employment of punitive measures (both
multilateral and unilateral), positive inducements or capacity-building
programs, and the use of arbitration or judicialized dispute settlement.
These are the factors most commonly mentioned in discussions of
compliance, because they, unlike many aspects of problem structure, are
manipulable through law and policy.
61 Again, ceteris paribus, cheaper or easier monitoring, such as through technological
advance, should increase compliance by enhancing transparency. See Mitchell, supra
note 59.
62 Realists contend that patterns of cooperation are often explained by the structure of
relative gains and losses among states and the resulting concern that such gains could be
converted to military power. See, e.g., JOSEPH M. GRIECO, COOPERATION AMONG
NATIONS: EUROPE, AMERICA, AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE, 28-29 (1990).
63 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, December 2, 1946, 62
Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72.
64 See Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change:
Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997, arts. 3(1), 3(2), 37 I.L.M. 22, 33 [hereinafter Kyoto
Protocol].
65 Similarly, compliance with basic tariff reductions, because they are easier to
implement, should be higher than compliance with the complex set of domestic rules and
standards contained in the TRIPS accord.
66 On "maligness" and "benignness," see J0RGEN WETrESTAD, DESIGNING
EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES 1-18 (1999).
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The standard-setting dynamic is centrally important to the
determination of compliance: the rules or standards chosen can be more or
less difficult to comply with.67 Similarly, conduct rules can be more or less
specific and/or clear.68  The regulated activity can be more or less
transparent and hence more or less easily monitored by other parties or
international or non-governmental organizations. 69  The institutionalized
70use of inducements or capacity-building programs, or the threat or
employment of sanctions for noncompliance may deter non-compliant acts
and affirmatively promote compliance by assuring all states that others are
complying with international rules. 71 The reactions to and institutions
created for occurrences of noncompliance are centrally important in many
rationalist compliance analyses.72 Many rationalist theories emphasize the
importance of deterrence and explore the optimal level of sanctions
required to sustain cooperation and compliance.73 In some cases the most
67 See supra Part II (discussing the centrality of the chosen standard for compliance).
68 This leads to more or less ambiguity about what constitutes compliance and
influences the degree to which states can make plausible claims concerning ambiguity to
justify or explain noncompliance; this in turn should alter the costs of noncompliance
and thus alter compliance rates.
70 For example, training programs through the World Intellectual Property
Organization may lower the costs of compliance with intellectual property commitments
by disseminating cost-effective and successful regulatory practices. See RYAN, supra
note 3, at 125-39 (discussing WIPO's training programs).
71 Problem structure can, as noted above, limit the degree to which specific or diffuse
reciprocity may enhance cooperation and compliance. However, the solution structure
chosen may also influence the production of compliance by authorizing suspensions of
specific benefits under certain conditions, as is done in the GATT, or creating other
sanctions that are not integrated into the benefit structure of cooperation but raise the
costs of noncompliance.
72 The recent evolution of the dispute settlement system within the GATTIWTO
system reflects empirically the pervasive concern with reactions to noncompliance and
the improvement of centralized enforcement. See generally MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK &
ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 51-94 (2nd ed., 1999); John
H. Jackson, Fragmentation or Unification Among International Institutions: The World
Trade Organization, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 823 (1999); ERNST-ULRICH
PETERSMANN, THE GATTIWTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM (1997) (discussing the
evolution of the GATTIWTO dispute settlement system from 1948 to 1996 and
presenting the problems the system continues to face); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies
Along With Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477
(1994). For earlier GATT history, see ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993). As noted,
the reciprocal nature of much trade cooperation enhances the prospects for compliance
with trade accords.
73 See, e.g., DOWNS & ROCKE, supra note 55. Downs and Rocke have developed a
sophisticated analysis of the necessary level of deterrence, suggesting that as a deductive
matter the deterrence embodied within the GATT/WTO system is insufficient to truly
deter noncompliance, but that it is explicable within a political context in which states
seek to maintain the freedom to respond to domestic demands for noncompliance. See
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important incentive to comply falls out of the formal solution structure
altogether: the fear of unilateral retaliation by a more powerful state, such
as the United States. 74 Nonetheless, the incentive effects are the same. In
short, rationalist theories explain compliance in instrumental terms that link
actor behavior to the nature of the problem, the structure of the chosen
solution, and the costs and benefits associated with different behaviors.
B. Norm-Driven Theories
Norm-driven theories differ from rationalist theories in their focus on
the power of norms and ideas to influence state behavior. These theories
do not necessarily claim that states are "irrational," but rather that there are
important influences on states that are not reducible to material costs and
benefits and that states are best understood as the product of, and denizens
of, a socialized environment. 75 This socialized environment can itself shape
and determine the interests that rationalist theorists use to explain
outcomes. Norm-driven theories can also be labeled "cognitive" or
"constructivist" because they stress the power of shared ideas and because
they see state interests and even states themselves as socially-constructed,
in part by norms, rather than as pre-theoretical givens.7 6
74 While the usual assumption in rationalist theory is that these incentives must be
built into the legal instrument or international institution itself, as is the case with the
GATT, cooperation-sustaining incentives need not be. U.S. unilateralism in a wide
range of areas has been deployed to punish perceived noncompliance, even if the
behavior in question was not noncompliant strictly construed. In the international
environmental realm, the United States has sometimes used unilateral sanctions to great
effect, notably under the Pelly Amendment to the Packwood-Magnuson Act. See
Packwood-Magnuson Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (1994); Pelly Amendment, 22 U.S.C.
§ 1978(a) (1994). While there is serious debate over whether such unilateralism is
ultimately desirable, it clearly can influence incentives to comply with international
rules. See generally Steve Charnovitz, Encouraging Environmental Cooperation
Through the Pelly Amendment, 3 J. ENV'T & DEV. 3 (1994) (discussing the efficacy of
Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson); CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 88-108 (discussing
unilateral sanctions); GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
RECONSIDERED (2d ed. 1990).
75 Constructivism is a branch of international relations theory that explores the means
by which concepts like sovereignty or the state, or specific state practices, are
constructed through a social process. See HASENCLEVER ET AL., supra note 6, at 188.
Unlike rationalists who begin with agents (states), many constructivists believe social
structures themselves constitute agents and hence are central to understanding outcomes
and behavior. See generally id. at 186-92; THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMS
AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS 45-47 (Peter Katzenstein ed., 1996); MARTHA
FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1996) (discussing how
the international social structure informs the behavior of states); Alexander Wendt,
Collective Identity Formation and the International State, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 384,
385 (1994); see also FRIEDRICH V. KRATO CHWiL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS (1989)
(critiquing theories which make the social order dependent upon the existence of certain
institutions, thus characterizing international relations in terms of anarchy).
76 The terms cognitive and constructivist have become terms of art in international
relations theory, but for present purposes there is significant overlap.
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Norm-driven theories are common in international legal scholarship.77
For example, some scholars have suggested that the legitimacy of the
process of rule creation itself is a central factor in explaining compliance.78
The legitimacy theory of compliance has as its core thesis the claim that "in
a community organized around rules, compliance is secured - to whatever
degree it is - at least in part by the perception of a rule as legitimate by
those to whom it is addressed., 79  The legitimacy of rules, in turn
determined by various, mainly procedural factors, allegedly determines the
rules' "compliance-pull" on governments. 80 In this theory, legitimacy and
its perception is not best understood as an incentive or disincentive to
compliance; legitimacy is a norm or value that influences state behavior
toward compliance when it is present.81
In a similar vein, though with greater focus on the domestic-
international interface, some scholars argue that the "vertical
internalization" of norms within states is a powerful promoter of
compliance with international commitments.82 Such internalization often
begins with norm entrepreneurs (individuals or non-governmental
organizations that promote specific norms)83 and issue-networks (networks
of actors interested in specific issues)84 and extends to actors within
governments. Then, "[o]nce nations begin to interact, a complex process
occurs, whereby international legal norms seep into, are internalized, and
become embedded in domestic legal and political processes," creating not
only compliance but obedience. 85 This process is critical, proponents argue,
to an explanation of why states follow international law.
The legal status of rules also may influence compliance with them.
That is, there may be a powerful norm in favor of compliance with the law
because it is law. The status of a commitment as law may implicate norms
77 See Robert 0. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two
Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 487, 488 (1997) (characterizing the impact that shared norms
have on state behavior as a "major theme of students of international law"). Such
theories are not limited to international legal scholarship, however. See, e.g., KRATO
CHWIL, supra note 75 (discussing norms in the context of the philosophy of international
relations).
78 See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AMER. J.
INT'LL. 705 (1988).
80 See id. at 713-59.
81 See id. at 705-13.
82 See Harold Honju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. 623,
673-79 (1998).
83 Ethan A. Nadelmann, Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in
International Society, 44 INT'L ORG. 479, 524-25 (1990); Sunstein, supra note 7, at 909.
84 See, e.g., Kathryn Sikkink, Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and
Sovereignty in Latin America, 47 INT'L ORG. 411 (1993).
85 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 205
(1996). By obedience Koh essentially means compliance that is internalized and
unthinking. Koh's account is primarly descriptive; he does not offer a theory of when, or
under what conditions, internalization does and does not occur.
[Vol. 32:387
2000] COMPLIANCE IN REGULATORY COOPERATION 407
of obligation flowing from the special role of law as an ordering principle
within contemporary societies. 86 Noncompliance with legal norms usually
entails particular forms of justification, because legal discourse is largely
about the giving of reasons for actions relating to rules. The justificatory
discourse that legal norms engender may also promote compliance because
it forces states to affirmatively defend their actions within the bounds of a
discursive tradition.
87
"Managerialists" have developed a prominent theory of compliance
with international commitments that is largely norm-driven, though it also
contains important rationalist themes.88 Starting from an assumption of
state compliance as the norm, managerialists argue that efforts to create
punitive enforcement mechanisms - such as are often defended by
rationalists - are generally misplaced, rarely available, and sometimes
counterproductive.89 Managerialists argue that noncompliance is typically
non-volitional: the result of a lack of administrative or financial capacity,
ambiguity in treaty terms, or unforeseen changes in conditions. 90 As a
result punitive measures will not effectively induce compliance. Rather, the
best response is to assist the deviant state, through the provision of
information, technical and financial assistance, or interpretive dialogue
aimed at resolving interpretive disputes, to come into compliance. 91 This
discursive process of noncompliance management should be non-
confrontational, forward-looking, and broadly cooperative, aimed not at
86 HENKIN, supra note 4 at 60. "There is an influence for law observance in the very
quality of law, in the sense of obligation which it implies." Id. Of course, this statement
can be seen as merely restating the issue: law is followed because law is obligatory.
87 See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L.
REv. 167, 209 (1999) ("...the requirement that transnational institutions offer reasons for
their decisions will increase the accountability of decisionmakers, just as the reasoning
of court opinions serves as a constraint on judicial power.") citing Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-66 (1992) ("The Court must take care to speak and act in ways
that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as
grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures
having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make.
Thus, the Court's legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under
circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted
by the Nation."). It is precisely the belief in this power of justification that undergirds
occasional suggestions that Permanent Members of the UN Security Council be required
to give reasons when exercising their veto.
88 See, e.g., Abram Chayes et al., Managing Compliance: A Comparative Perspective,
in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS, supra note 5, at 39; see also CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note
5, at 1-28 (discussing theory of compliance, the focus of treaties, and the norms that
apply); CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 177-87.
89 See Chayes et al., supra note 88, at 49.
90 See id. at 41-42.
91 Similar arguments have been made (and criticized) in the domestic regulatory
context. See Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving
Theory of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181 (1998).
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identifying wrongful behavior but at the collective improvement of
performance.92 This process works, managerialists suggest, in part because
states must increasingly take part in international cooperative regimes and
because they seek to be members in good standing within these regimes.93
Thus the social nature of the international system is an important
component of managerial compliance theory.
The debate over managerialism illustrates a key difference between
norm-driven and rationalist approaches to compliance. Rationalists have
criticized managerialism on the grounds that the empirical evidence for it
- much of it drawn from environmental treaties - suffers from selection
bias because it fails to account for the depth of the cooperative solution
chosen.94 Selection bias, as the term implies, is the failure to select cases
that appropriately represent the larger universe of cases a theory addresses:
for example, to look only at successful cases of cooperation produces
selection bias in a study of the causes of cooperation.95 Depth refers in this
context to the degree of costly change a treaty requires from the status quo
ante. Rationalist critics of managerialism agree that "shallow" treaties
exhibit high levels of compliance and therefore can employ "management"
with some success. 9 6 For deeper treaties that demand more costly actions,
however, they argue managerial prescriptions are not sufficient; more
severe punishments are necessary to maintain compliance.97 This is so
because rationalists believe incentives to deviate from a treaty's
commitments rise as the depth and costs of change also rise.98 Thus,
rationalist critics argue, enforcement is increasingly necessary to the
92 See Martti Koskenniemi, Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance? Reflections on the
Enforcement of the Montreal Protocol, 1992 Y.B. INT'L ENVT'L. L., 123 (discussing the
role of wrongfulness in noncompliance systems such as the one in the Montreal Protocol
on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer). A parallel debate is increasingly found in
discussions and practice of domestic law compliance. See generally Rechtschaffen, supra
note 91, at 1184 (stating that U.S. states "have been leading the charge to modify
enforcement practices. They have championed a 'compliance first' strategy that
emphasizes working cooperatively with violators to obtain compliance, and eschewing
penalties in favor of persuasion.").
93 See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 271-74.
94 See Downs et al., supra note 5, at 387-99; George W. Downs, Enforcement and the
Evolution of Cooperation, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 319, 329 (1998).
95 David Collier & James Mahoney, Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in
Qualitative Research, 49 WORLD POL. 56, 59 (1996).
96 Downs et al., supra note 5, at 388-92.
97 See id.
98 This is true particularly in a collaboration game situation, where the dominant
strategy is noncompliance. The deepening of coordination games can also create stronger
incentives to deviate from equilibrium if the distribution of costs and benefits of
different equilibria vary from actor to actor; one actor may choose to attempt to shift the
game from one equilibria to another. See generally Krasner, supra note 47, at 234-47
(discussing the importance of distributional issues).
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production of compliance as the depth of cooperation embodied in an
agreement increases.
99
C. Liberal Theories
Liberalism is an increasingly prominent branch of international
relations theory that rejects the focus on the state as a unitary actor
prevalent in rationalist theory yet also rejects the largely sociological
approach of norm-driven theory. Contemporary liberal international
relations theory stresses domestic-level actors and structures in explaining
external behavior.100 While norm-driven theories often look to the domestic
process,' 0' liberal theory does not embrace the concept of international
norms nor does it reject the rationalists' focus on strategic interaction. 10 2
Indeed, strategic interaction is a key component. However, the locus of
attention is on domestic actors, the institutions that aggregate and shape the
interests of such actors, and the variation among states in these internal
attributes.'03
The literature in political science on the "democratic peace," for
instance, suggests that democratic institutions significantly constrain the
99 The recent debate between proponents of rationalist and norm-driven theories
about the importance of treaty depth reflects the distinction I drew earlier between
compliance and effectiveness. A shallow treaty is almost by definition ineffective or of
low effectiveness: to be shallow, it must require little or no behavioral change from the
status quo ante. A deep treaty may be effective because it requires substantial change -
though it may be ineffective if such change fails to occur. Thus, overstating to some
degree, depth may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for effectiveness.
100 See Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of
International Politics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513, 514 (1997).
101 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 5, at 2631-45. Liberal international relations theory also
looks to the impact of ideas and norms, but grounds this impact in the resulting effects
on the individuals and societal groups that create (mediated by institutions) state
preferences. States as entities are not "socialized" in the liberal view; rather, individuals
may be, but then they act rationally and strategically to achieve political ends.
102 See Moravcsik, supra note 100, at 520 ("The configuration of interdependent state
preferences determines state behavior.").
103 In Moravcsik's words, "liberal IR theory elaborates the insight that state-society
relations - the relationship of states to the domestic and transnational social context in
which they are embedded - have a fundamental impact on state behavior in world
politics." Id. at 513. He grounds liberal theory in three core assumptions: the primacy of
individuals and private groups as actors, the notion that states represent some subset of
these actors, and the notion that the configuration of the resulting state preferences
shapes behavior. See id. at 516-24. See also Kal Raustiala, Domestic Institutions and
International Regulatory Cooperation: Comparative Responses to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, 49 WORLD POL. 482 (1997) (providing a parallel argument that uses
a variant of liberal theory to explain divergent approaches to international regulatory
cooperation) [hereinafter Raustiala, Domestic Institutions and International Regulatory
Cooperation].
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types of conflicts in which democratic states engage. 1°4 The prominence
and important policy implications of this argument have spearheaded
greater attention to the influence of domestic structure generally. In a
similar vein, proponents of liberal theory have suggested that liberal states
- generally, states with representative governments, constitutional
protections for individual rights, and market economies - operate in an
international "zone of law" rather than a "zone of politics." 1°5 International
law, and correspondingly compliance with international commitments, is
qualitatively distinct within the community of liberal states. The presence
of domestic liberal and/or democratic institutions thus may promote
compliance with international legal rules, just as it has promoted the
development of "complex interdependence" among the nations of the
West. 16
Because one common facet of liberal societies is domestic reverence
for the "rule of law," liberal theory suggests that liberal states may agree to
and comply with decisions by international tribunals more readily than
illiberal states. 107
States "willing to submit to the rule of law and civil society at the
domestic level are more likely to submit to their analogues at the
international level."108  Hence, aspects of domestic structure, such as
constitutional design, political tradition, and so forth may directly influence
compliance levels. Domestic structure may also influence compliance
104 The basic claim is that democracies rarely or never engage in war with one another.
See, e.g., BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR A POST-
COLD WAR WORLD 3-5 (1993); Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign
Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 205-06 (1983). For a cautionary variation on the
argument, see Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Democratization and the Danger of
War, 20 INT'L SEC. 5 (1995) (discussing the aggressiveness of transitional democracies).
The theory of the democratic peace has antecedents in Immanuel Kant's thought. See
Doyle, supra; see also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Constitutionalize International
Law and Foreign Policy for the Benefit of Civil Society?, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 7-12
(1998) (discussing Kant's views of international affairs); Fernando R. Tes6n, The
Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 53 (1992).
105 Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, EUR. J.
INT'LL. (1995).
106 See ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE:
WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION 29-30 (1977) (introducing the phrase "complex
interdependence").
107 Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273, 331 (1997); William J. Dixon,
Democracy and the Management of International Conflict, 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 42, 46
(1993). On the distinctive qualities of liberal states with regard to international law see
Petersmann, supra note 104 and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and
International Adjudication: How to Constitutionalize the U.N. Dispute Settlement
System, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 753, 764-65 (1999).
108 Charles A. Kupchan & Clifford A. Kupchan, Concerts, Collective Security, and the
Future of Europe, INT'L SECURITY, Summer 1991, at 114, 149 n.100.
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indirectly: liberal states appear more willing, for example, to receive and
engage in scrutiny of domestic laws and policies. °9 Perhaps, as a result,
liberal states appear more willing to create the kinds of domestically-
focused international institutions that can promote compliance. ° In other
words, variations in domestic structure may in turn shape the chosen
solution structure to a shared international problem, and this approach may
explain variations in compliance.
Finally, liberal theory suggests that cooperation generally and, in turn,
compliance with legal rules specifically may be explained by who benefits
and who loses in a given cooperative setting: the distributional impacts, at a
societal level, of the regulatory structure created by the legal instrument.
These distributional impacts are in turn shaped and aggregated by domestic
political and legal institutions.' For example, some analyses of domestic
trade politics suggest that one factor explaining compliance with
international trade law is the shifting interests of firms and trade-induced
changes in the balance of political power between firms aided and firms
injured by extensive economic interdependence.1 2 Thus, international law
can be progressively self-enforcing as these societal lock-in effects stabilize
domestic preferences around compliance with international
commitments.'
3
IV. COMPLIANCE & EFFECTIVENESS: SOME EVIDENCE FROM
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
International environmental law has been fertile ground for research on
treaty compliance and effectiveness. In the last thirty years, many treaties
have been negotiated addressing a wide range of global and regional
environmental issues, ranging from international trade in endangered
species to wetlands protection to global climate change to marine pollution
from ships." 4 Because in a large fraction of these cases the underlying
109 See Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, Conclusions, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE, supra note 12, at 659, 694-95.
11o See id. at 691. As I discuss further below, there is evidence from international
environmental treaties that relatively intrusive systems for the review of domestic
implementation promote compliance and effectiveness.
111 See, e.g., Raustiala, Domestic Institutions and International Regulatory
Cooperation, supra note 103, at 482-83, 507.
112 See HELEN V. MILNER, RESISTING PROTECTIONISM : GLOBAL INDUSTRIES AND THE
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 290-91 (1988).
113 Fixed investments by firms, the interests of political organizations (e.g., NGOs),
and even institutional adaptation by the state may embed cooperation domestically. See
Moravcsik, supra note 100, at 537.
114 See generally THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 12 (presenting in-
depth analyses of these agreements).
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environmental problems continue to worsen,1 l5 concern with treaty
implementation, compliance, and effectiveness has been high. Several
large-scale studies of environmental treaties are underway or recently
completed, and these provide new insights into the causality of compliance
and effectiveness.1 16 This line of research has begun to examine compliance
in counterintuitive ways, such as by examining the ways in which
compliance concerns can undermine the effectiveness of legal strategies,
1 7
or how noncompliance can itself be part of a successful regulatory
strategy. 1
18
Below I briefly present some of the more interesting or powerful
insights and arguments that have emerged from this multidisciplinary body
of research. The first subsection illustrates the importance of "architecture"
as a regulatory strategy, using the example of intentional marine oil
pollution" 9 and the power of non-state actors to promote compliance with
regulatory rules governing pollution. The next subsection argues that
regularized systems for the review of national implementation can promote
effective international cooperation by focusing on performance and
collective learning rather than the punishment of compliance. Thus, both of
these arguments concern ways in which the effectiveness of treaty
instruments can be enhanced through institutional design: through changes
in the solution structure of the international regime. Drawing on a study of
acid rain cooperation in Europe, the third subsection presents the argument
that regulatory rules are sometimes best seen as normative registers of
intent and commitment that can be skillfully used by political actors to
further cooperation. In other words, an effective regulatory regime does not
require strong rules that are complied with, and indeed noncompliance may
further the regime's effectiveness. The last subsection takes this argument
one step further, and tackles the implicit focus in most discussions of
compliance on binding treaties as the optimal legal form. I suggest that non-
binding agreements, which side-step the entire question of legal
compliance, offer significant advantages - in part for reasons related to
compliance concerns - and hence they may, under some circumstances, be
115 See United Nations Environment Programme, Global Environment Outlook 2000
(visited Mar. 22, 2000) http://www.unep.org/unep/eia/geo2000/english/index.htm
(assessing the state of the global environment for a series of problems addressed under
international law).
16 See THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES: CAUSAL
CONNECTIONS AND BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS, supra note 1; WETrESTAD, supra note 66;
ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS, supra note 5; THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 12.
117 See Raustiala & Victor, supra note 109, at 681-84.
118 See Marc A. Levy et al., Improving the Effectiveness of International
Environmental Institutions, in INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES FOR EFFECTIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 23, at 398, 412-14.
119 See Lessig, supra note 1, at 663-64.
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equally or more effective regulatory instruments than are binding
international agreements.
A. Architecture and the Private Enforcement of International Rules
One of the most comprehensive studies of treaty compliance is Ronald
Mitchell's analysis of the international rules governing intentional marine
oil pollution.'20 Intentional oil pollution occurs through the routine
operations of ocean-going tankers, as opposed to accident spills of the type
associated with the Exxon Valdez disaster in Alaska.' 2' While spills are
dramatic and sometimes devastating for local ecosystems, the vast majority
of oil entering the oceans is the result of normal operations like tanker
cleaning. 122 Beginning with the 1954 Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 23 a series of international agreements were
negotiated to govern routine oil pollution at sea. Compliance with these
accords has varied widely, and thus they provide an interesting test case for
hypotheses about the causality of compliance.
124
In its early history, the intentional oil pollution regime employed a
series of control measures focused on regulating the act of discharging oil
from tankers. 1' These included limits on the size and location of
discharges and rules mandating the recording of each discharge.
26
Discharges were largely unobservable on the high seas, and hence the
regulatory rules were an ineffective deterrent. These rules were replaced in
1978 by equipment standards: the mandated use, for new tankers, of
segregated ballast tanks (SBT), and the option of SBT or a new washing
technique for older tankers. 127 Despite the fact that equipment standards
such as SBT were significantly more expensive than the previous discharge
controls, compliance with the SBT requirement was much higher.
128
One reason for the higher levels of compliance was that the
introduction of SBT included a grant of legal authority to port states to
120 See MITCHELL, supra note 5; Ronald Mitchell et al., International Vessel-Source
Oil Pollution, in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES:
CAUSAL CONNECTIONS AND BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS, supra note 1, at 33, 33-90.4.
121 See Ronald Mitchell, Intentional Oil Pollution of the Oceans, in INSTITUTIONS FOR
THE EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra
note 23, at 183, 183.
12 See Mitchell et al., supra note 120, at 35 (providing aggregated data on pollution
sources).
123 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 12,
1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989.
124 See Mitchell et al., supra note 120, at 41 (noting that attempts at negotiating
controls occurred as early 1926).
125 See Mitchell, supra note 121, at 193-221.
126 See id. at 200.
127 See Mitchell et al., supra note 120, at 43-45.
128 See Mitchell, supra note 121, at 211-15.
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detain non-compliant ships. 129 In practice, however, this sanction, because
extreme, was rarely used. 130 A much more powerful and theoretically-
interesting cause of higher compliance levels is related to the structure of
the tanker industry, the role of private actors within that structure, and the
nature of an equipment standard. Though they were not legally obligated to
do so, shipbuilders and ship-classification societies, who are private actors
with pre-existing roles in the industry, ensured that SBT was integrated
when a new ship was commissioned and built.' 31 Lack of proper
classification from a society withheld necessary insurance and made the
operation of the tanker prohibitively costly. 132 These private actors were not
compelled to enforce the international standard but rather chose to use it as
an authoritative benchmark. This decision, in conjunction with the pre-
existing role these actors played in the industry, helped ensure compliance
by ship owners with the international rule.133 Thus, one lesson of the oil
pollution case is that the production of compliance with an international
standard may largely result from private actors and market forces, and may
not require an exclusive focus on government actions, though here the
prospect of the sanction of ship detainment reinforced the pressures and
incentives that stemmed from non-governmental sources. 1
34
A second lesson of the oil pollution case is the critical importance of
"architecture" as a regulatory strategy. It is important to underscore that the
role that industry actors played in the production of compliance with SBT
was contingent on the particular quality of the SBT rule itself. Because SBT
was integral to the ship itself, the decision to build with SBT involved a
one-time, irreversible decision to comply with international standards, in
contrast to the continuous series of essentially unverifiable decisions
associated with the discharge standard. Once installed, SBT could not be
de-installed. Compliance was quite literally built into the vessels. By
creating a structure of rules that made a noncompliance decision very costly
and capitalized on the structure of the solution itself - the irreversible
decision to build with new equipment - the revised oil pollution regime
prevented noncompliance rather than deterred it. This form of prevention
resonates with recent research in domestic law on architecture as a
129 See id. at 212.
130 See id. at 220.
131 See id.
132 See id.
131 See id. at 219-20. It is not clear to what degree this result was intended. These
groups had little incentive not to follow international law and ensure compliance with the
treaty rules, but it is not clear why they chose to in effect "enforce" the SBT
requirement. See id.
134 See generally Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the
NewAdministrative Law, in RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER
331 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 1999) (discussing the role of non-governmental actors in the
exercise of public authority in the domestic administrative context).
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regulatory strategy. 135 Just as speed bumps can regulate traffic speed even
in the absence of police patrols and tickets, so, too, the equipment standards
blocked discharges without the need for external monitoring of ship
operations. While these physical barriers can at the margin become a form
of deterrence - speed bumps, for example, deter noncompliance with
traffic laws by threatening damage to cars and occupants - the causal link
and mode of operation is distinctive.
B. Systems for Implementation Review
The oil pollution regime focused on private actors and their behavior
in the global commons. Many international environmental treaties focus, at
least in proximate terms, on state behavior and state compliance, even if the
ultimate regulatory targets are private actors. For example, control of
nitrous oxide pollution (a form of air pollution) requires regulation of the
emissions of many individually-owned cars and trucks. But the relevant
international treaties address aggregate national emissions; compliance with
international law is gauged by reference to aggregate national emissions.
136
How to effectively control such emissions is a major challenge for
industrialized societies, and, as is true for many such cases, there are no
clear technological fixes like SBT for nitrous oxide pollution.
For such complex regulatory issues - which are a mainstay of
contemporary international environmental law - effective regulation and
improved treaty compliance can be promoted through the promulgation of
international rules and standards followed by collective international review
of domestic implementation. This review often takes place through formal
procedures and bodies created by treaty, but also sometimes involves
informal, extra-legal procedures. 137These formal and informal procedures
are collectively termed "systems for implementation review."' 3 8
Systems for implementation review ("SIRs") include regularized
collection of relevant data from state parties, meetings of experts and
political leaders, collective reviews of performance, and processes for the
adjustment of treaty commitments in light of new information and
experiences. 139 Not all SIRs involve all these aspects, but many reappear
135 See Lessig, supra note 1, at 663-64. Mitchell himself prefers the term "preventive
strategies."
136 Nitrous oxide is governed internationally by the Protocol to the 1974 Convention
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention Concerning the Control of
Emissions of Nitrous Oxides or Their Transboundary Fluxes, Oct. 31, 1988, 28 I.L.M.
212.
137 The following discussion tracks that in Victor et al., supra note 12, at 1-46.
139 See id. at 3.
139 See id. SIRs are not limited to environmental treaties; as discussed below, the
World Trade Organization's Trade Policy Review Mechanism is a form of SIR. See
generally DONALD B. KEESING, IMPROVING TRADE POLICY REVIEWS IN THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION (1998) (discussing the Trade Policy Review Mechanism). The
International Monetary Fund also engages in "surveillance" of member states'
macroeconomic policies through a regularized review process. See Second Amendment
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frequently. SIRs perform a number of important functions that both theories
of international institutions and empirical evidence suggest further
cooperation and promote compliance and effectiveness. By increasing the
flow of information among states, SIRs enhance cooperation by lowering
the associated transaction costs. 140 More specifically, by making national
actions more transparent, SIRs often help assure reluctant participants that
others are complying with shared obligations.1 41 Where choices are
interdependent - that is, where actors are likely to comply conditionally
based on others' behavior - this can foster compliance by making clear
other actors' compliance. Such "contingent compliance" may be common,
and thus SIRs are an important tool in compliance promotion. 142 SIRs may
also redistribute power to domestic actors that favor full implementation
and compliance. Such actors can use the international process to strengthen
their position in domestic policy debates, leveraging the information the
SIR supplies and the legitimacy it may endow. By involving relevant
industry and other interested actors, SIRs can help produce more realistic,
achievable rules and standards and may also help produce "buy-in" to the
regulatory decisions undertaken. 143 SIRs can provide assistance and
capacity-building tools to non-compliant states, helping to manage
compliance in line with managerial theory. 144 Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, SIRs can promote "learning" by governments and private
actors. Governments can learn to make better, more effective and
implementable commitments collectively, and they can also better
implement existing commitments by learning from the efforts of other
to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Second Amendment,
April 30, 1976, art. IV, §3, 29 U.S.T. 2203, 2209.
140 This claim echoes functional or neo-liberal institutionalist arguments about the role
of international institutions in international cooperation. See, e.g., KEOHANE, supra note
6, at 243-59; HASENCLEVER ET AL., supra note 6, at 1-7.
141 Transparency is a central theme in many SIRs. The WTO's Trade Policy Review
Mechanism formal purpose is, for example, "to contribute to improved adherence by all
WTO Members to rules, disciplines and commitments made under the Multilateral Trade
Agreements... by achieving greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade
policies and practices of Members." KEESING, supra note 139, at 5 (citing WTO
Agreement, Annex 3).
142 See Simmons, supra note 5, at 81.
143 The former is likely to be more evident than the latter. See Victor et al., National
Implementation, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 12, at 305, 305-09
(presenting a related discussion). There is an extensive literature on regulatory
negotiation in the domestic context; see generally Jody Freeman, The Private Role in
Public Governance, 75 NYU L. REV 600 (2000); Jody Freeman, Collaborative
Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1997).
144 See supra Part III(B) (discussing managerialism).
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states and systematically involving experts from a wide range of interested
private actors.
145
Perhaps the best-developed SIR in international environmental law is
that of the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone
Layer.146 The Montreal Protocol is widely regarded as one of the most
successful examples of multilateral environmental cooperation. 147 It
regulates a wide range of substances that destroy stratospheric ozone
(stratospheric ozone protects the earth from harmful ultraviolet radiation)
and has reduced the production of some of these substances to very low
levels. 148 Over time, the parties to the Montreal Protocol have created a
complex array of ozone-related regulations that have been regularly revised
in light of new scientific and technical information. 149 By creating an
ongoing process of performance review and technical assessment, the
formal and informal implementation review mechanisms of the Montreal
Protocol have promoted relatively thorough implementation, learning,
compliance, and effectiveness.
The basis of the Montreal Protocol SIR is the data reporting procedure.
Each year parties to the Protocol must provide to the treaty Secretariat
statistical data on the production, import, and export of a series of
substances controlled by the treaty.'5u These data, and other data
submissions by governments, are analyzed and used by a wide range of
treaty-related institutional bodies: the Ozone Secretariat, an Implementation
Committee, the Executive Committee of the Multilateral Fund (the
145 For a parallel, quite elaborated argument in the domestic context, see Michael C.
Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 267 (1998).
146 Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M.
1541.
147 For the definitive history of the negotiation of the Montreal Protocol, see RICHARD
ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY (1991); see also Edward A. Parson, Protecting the
Ozone Layer, in INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 23, at 27, 71; Edith Brown Weiss, The Five
International Treaties: A Living History, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS, supra note 5, at 89, 157;
David D. Caron, Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer and the Structure of
International Environmental Lawmaking, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 755, 759-
61 (1991). United Nations Environment Programme, The Ozone Secretariat (visited
Mar. 2, 2000) http://www.unep.org/unep/secretar/ozone/home.htm (providing more
recent information).
148 See Owen Greene, The System for Implementation Review in the Ozone Regime, in
THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 12, at 89, 89-92.
149 See Edward A. Parson & Owen Greene, The Complex Chemistry of the
International Ozone Agreements, ENVIRONMENT, Mar. 1995, at 16, 20.
150 See Greene, supra note 148, at 92-124. In this sense, by looking at direct data, the
Montreal Protocol SIR is superior to similar efforts, such as that within the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species, which focus on "paper reviews" of
national legislation implementing the treaty's provisions. See id. at 118-19.
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Multilateral Fund exists to help cover the financial costs of compliance by
developing states, such as the improvement of administrative capacity), and
a series of expert advisory bodies known as assessment panels. These
include a scientific assessment panel, an environmental assessment panel,
and a technical and economic assessment panel.' 5' The assessment panels
can be quite large; the scientific assessment panel has over 500 members.
52
Within the assessment panels, working groups and committees address,
inter alia, issues of implementation by economies in transition and
determinations of "essential uses" for which the regulation of controlled
substances is eased. 153 As Owen Greene and David Victor have shown,
other organizations, such as the Global Environment Facility and the UN
Development Programme, play an important though informal role in the
Montreal Protocol review process. 154 The wealth of institutions that are
comprised by the SIR has, in the view of several analysts, fostered a
progressive expansion of the Protocol's commitments and has contributed
to the effectiveness of the regime.1
55
In particular, the Montreal Protocol's SIR has played an important role
in addressing noncompliance by parties. The treatment of noncompliance
by the SIR is complex and reflects both sides of the managerialism-
enforcement debate discussed above. 56 In 1992, the parties to the Montreal
Protocol created a specific Non-Compliance Procedure ("NCP") to be
operated by an Implementation Committee. 157 This procedure serves as a
model for other environmental regimes, such as the climate change
regime.158 There are two components to the Montreal Protocol procedure: a
"regular" component that meets on a regular basis and acts as a standing
body to hear any compliance-related issues that parties or Committee
151 See id.
152 See Interviews with various members of the Ozone Secretariat, in Nairobi, Kenya
(Nov. 1999)[hereinafter Interviews].
153 See Greene, supra note 148, at 94-96.
54 See id. at 122.
155 See id. at 118-24; David G. Victor, The Operation and Effectiveness of the
Montreal Protocol's Non-Compliance Procedure, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE, supra note 12, at 137, 137-40.
156 See supra Part II.
157 See Review of the Non-Compliance Procedure of the Montreal Protocol Pursuant
to Decision IX/35 of the Ninth Meeting of the Parties, U.N. Environment Programme,
U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.4/111 (1998). The NCP was modified in 1998. See id. On
the operation of the NCP, see Patrick Szdll, Implementation Control: Non-Compliance
Procedure and Dispute Settlement in the Ozone Regime, in THE OZONE TREATIES AND
THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE BUILDING OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES 43
(Winfried Lang ed., 1996), Victor, supra note 155, Koskenneimi, supra note 92, at 128-
34, and Elizabeth P. Barratt-Brown, Building a Monitoring and Compliance Regime
Under the Montreal Protocol, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 519, 563-69 (1991).
158 See Interviews with various members of the UNFCCC Secretariat, in Bonn,
Germany (Nov. 1999).
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members may think are important; and an "ad hoe" component that
addresses specific submissions about noncompliance. 159 The main objective
is to create a multilateral, non-confrontational, and discursive process to
further implementation - a process very much in line with managerial
precepts. The Committee has no direct levers over non-compliant states and
does not act in a judicial mode; discussions are not couched as legal
arguments.160 Rather, the Committee relies upon facilitation and whatever
political pressure emerges from open, transparent discussion of compliance
difficulties. It employs what is essentially an administrative, rather than a
judicial, approach to noncompliance.
Interestingly, several parties have used the Non-Compliance Procedure
to essentially "accuse" themselves of noncompliance. In 1995, Belarus,
Bulgaria, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine all made submissions of
noncompliance that were "interpreted" as formal applications under the
Procedure. 16' The Implementation Committee initiated a process of
development of compliance plans and subsequent reviews of those plans by
the Committee.162 Because complex technical issues were involved, the
Committee also sought the advice of experts from the assessment panels
described above.'
63
A central part of the power of the Implementation Committee to foster
and elicit compliance from the states involved stems from a decision by an
organization external to the treaty: the Global Environment Facility. The
Global Environment Facility was providing funds for the incremental costs
of compliance with the Montreal Protocol to the countries involved. 64 The
Global Environment Facility decided to withhold additional funds for new
ozone-related projects in those states until their compliance plans were
approved by the Implementation Committee. 65 This decision was critical
to the success of the NCP in these cases. The Implementation Committee's
handling of the submissions and review of subsequent country-specific
plans has worked well, and all the states involved in the NCP process were,
as of 1998, moving toward full compliance with the Montreal Protocol.
166
Since this first set of cases, several other parties facing compliance
difficulties (all with economies in transition) have been brought before the
Committee using the Non-Compliance Procedure, though in these cases it is
159 See Victor, supra note 155.
160 See Interviews, supra note 152.
161 See Victor, supra note 155, at 156, 174 n.64 (citing UNEP/Ozl.Pro/ImpCom/11/1,
14 September 1995, at 13-14).
162 See id. at 155-60 (discussing this case in more detail).
163 See id. at 159.
'64 See id. at 164.
165 See Greene, supra note 148, at 105.
166 See Victor, supra note 155, at 159.
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the Secretariat that brought the cases forward using data supplied by the
parties themselves in their annual reports.
167
What lessons can be drawn from this experience for compliance
theory? The Non-Compliance Procedure, and its linkage to a form of aid
conditionality, can be interpreted as supporting either the norm-driven
approach of managerialism or the rationalist, enforcement-focused views of
its critics. The existence of assistance tied to a discursive, non-
confrontational process fits with the cooperative, capacity-building thrust of
managerialism, while the link between noncompliance and denial of future
funds, which in practice has been critical to the success of the procedure, is
consistent with the views of rationalist critics. 168 Under either interpretation,
however, it is important to note that the linkage between continued
economic aid and compliant behavior is not built directly into the Montreal
Protocol treaty structure, but rather emerged informally from decisions by
the Global Environment Facility in conjunction with the Implementation
Committee. This highlights the importance of research that looks beyond
formal legal text and closely traces the process of interaction among the
relevant actors and institutions.
More broadly, the case suggests that implementation review can be an
effective aid to uncovering compliance - many of the submissions were
voluntary, and all emerged from the broader SIR process - and can be
effective in crafting useful and productive compliance strategies. The case
also suggests that while international lawyers have long looked to courts
and tribunals as the preferred mode of peaceful adjudication in the
international system, non-judicial and largely administrative structures such
as the NCP may be more effective in a second-best world of sovereign
states largely unwilling to seek or abide international legal judgments.
Finally, the Montreal Protocol experience shows that such a compliance
institution can build credibility and power slowly but meaningfully. The
NCP was dormant for several years, but now is being invoked directly by
the Secretariat using data from national reports. This suggests it is
important to consider the need for such institutions early in the process of
regime formation, before compliance issues rise to the fore.
C. International Standards and the Politics of Noncompliance
While implementation review can in practice be an often highly
technical exercise with input by experts drawn from industry and science,
some analyses of international environmental commitments have
167 See Interview with K.M. Sarma, Executive Secretary of the Ozone Secretariat, in
Nairobi, Kenya, (Nov. 4, 1999).
168 Moreover, decisions by the Multilateral Fund of the Protocol to terminate funding
to those developing country parties that failed to provide baseline data on production and
use - as required by the treaty - has also been successful at inducing compliance with
that basic requirement. See Victor, supra note 155, at 152; see also Elizabeth R.
DeSombre & Joanne Kauffman, The Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund; Partial
Success Story, in INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AID: PITFALLS AND PROMISES 89
(Robert O. Keohane & Marc A. Levy eds., 1996).
[Vol. 32:387
20001 COMPLIANCE IN REGULATORY COOPERATION 421
emphasized the importance of popular politics to the regulatory process and
the many ways in which international commitments may influence national
behavior. In particular, the history of acid rain cooperation in Europe
illustrates well the importance of institutional enmeshment and the
somewhat paradoxical role that noncompliance can play in promoting
effective international regulation.
The problem of transboundary acid deposition (or "acid rain") in
Europe has been addressed through the Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution Convention of 1979 ("LRTAP")' and its subsequent pollutant-
specific protocols (a sulfur protocol was signed in 1985, a nitrogen oxides
protocol in 1988, a volatile organic compounds protocol in 1991, and a
second sulfur protocol in 1994).'70 The regime also includes a scientific
data-gathering component, "EMEP," which actually pre-dates the
Convention but was incorporated into it.171 EMEP was critical to the
success of LRTAP because it provided a fairly neutral, respected source of
environmental data that helped many initially skeptical states recognize the
impact of the acid rain problem within their own borders.
Marc Levy's study of the early years of the acid rain regime suggests
that that the regulatory rules embodied in LRTAP and its Protocols did not
serve primarily as binding rules that altered behavior through the force of
legal prescription. Rather, they operated largely as a normative register of
political commitment to the European environment. Their mode of
influence was persuasion rather than coercion. As Levy argues, this role
was quite important in practice:
The regulatory rules [of LRTAP] were weak but not irrelevant. They
served a vital role in magnifying pressure on recalcitrant states, in
keeping the consensus building activities high on governments' agendas,
and in assisting domestic environmental proponents of action. Rules
serve these functions in a process I call "tote-board diplomacy."....If
mutual adjustment toward joint gains is the goal, one needs strong rules
that are complied with. But in a process of tote-board diplomacy weak
169 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, 18 I.L.M.
1442. See generally Don Munton et al., Acid Rain in Europe and North America, in THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES: CAUSAL CONNECTIONS
AND BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS, supra note 1, at 155, 155-247 (assessing the impact of
LRTAP on the acid rain problem during the 1980s); MARVIN S. SOROos, THE
ENDANGERED ATMOSPHERE: PRESERVING A GLOBAL COMMONS 6-9 (1997) (discussing the
development of the LRTAP regime); SONJA BOEHMER-CHRISTIANSEN & JIM SKEA, ACID
POLITICS: ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY POLICIES IN BRITAIN AND GERMANY 185-289
(1991) (discussing the same).
170 Marc A. Levy, European Acid Rain: The Power of Tote-Board Diplomacy, in
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 75, 91-105 (Peter M. Haas et al. eds., 1993).
171 See id. at 166. EMEP stands for the Cooperative Programme for the Monitoring
and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe and was
begun by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in the wake of
the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. See id.
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rules can work quite well, and noncompliance can be part of a successful
strategy. In the case of LRTAP, regulatory protocols served as a
normative register [a tote-board], indicating both what behavior was
considered legitimate and which countries had accepted such a standard
as a guide to national policy.
172
The LRTAP story is a complex one involving Cold War diplomacy,
European cohesion, and evolving science. The states involved in LRTAP
had varied reasons for their interest in the treaty: Nordic countries suffered
from imported acid deposition, for example, while the Soviet Union was
interested in promoting East-West cooperation. 173 Many states "over-
complied," going well beyond the regulatory targets, while others failed to
comply or just met the targets.174 For the states that changed policies or
behavior based on the treaty regime - for those states for whom the regime
appeared to be effective - Levy argues they changed behavior for one of
two reasons. Some states did so primarily because the cooperative process,
and in particular the EMEP program, prompted them to reevaluate their
interests with regard to acid rain control.1 75 Other states changed behavior
primarily because of political pressure aided and abetted by the regime's
regulatory rules and standards - by tote-board diplomacy. 76 Germany is
an example of the former, a state that discovered, through scientific
programmatic activities created by the regime, that it, too, suffered harm
from transboundary acid rain.1 77 It subsequently favored stricter
international regulation. The United Kingdom is an example of the latter, in
which the local effects of transboundary acid rain were minimal, but
domestic actors used the regulatory provisions and emissions targets of the
international regime in their political efforts domestically.1 78 LRTAP set
clear benchmarks that aided domestic (and foreign) criticisms of British
policy, and helped propel cooperation forward.1
79
The complexity of LRTAP's impact on state behavior illustrates the
frequent disjuncture between compliance and effectiveness. The ultimate
aim of LRTAP and its pollution-specific Protocols was to reduce the acid
rain problem throughout Europe, but compliance with the concrete
regulatory rules of the regime was only a small part of the process of
achieving this aim. LRTAP's primary means of influence was to spur the
reevaluation of interests by governments. Indeed, noncompliance with
172 See id. at 76-77.
173 See Munton et al., supra note 169, at 182-92.
174 See id. at 178-79. Reductions in nitrous oxide emissions from 1980 to 1994, for
example, range from 61% to -786%. See id. The Protocol's target was a freeze by 1995
at 1987 levels. See id. at 170.
175 See Levy, supra note 170, at 116-22.
176 See id. at 122-27.
177 See id. at 111-12.
178 See id. at 123-26.
179 See Munton et al., supra note 169, at 235.
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international rules appeared to have ultimately fed the cooperative process
by providing an incentive and a focal point for domestic pressure to do
more to address acid rain and the European environment generally. 80 This
argument that "non-compliance can be part of a successful strategy"'' is
dependent, however, on certain preconditions. The most central
precondition is the existence of open and responsive governments and
institutions that permitted societal demands to be transmitted to government
elites. In other words, Levy's argument about the intersection between
noncompliance and treaty rules is fundamentally liberal, in the sense of the
liberal international relations theory discussed in Part I above. 182 Societal
preferences and structure of state-society relations were critical to the
operation and power of tote-board diplomacy.
D. Binding and Non-Binding Instruments
The preceding subsections have focused on the causality of
compliance and the interaction between compliance and effectiveness
within the context of legally-binding agreements. The LRTAP story
suggests a rethinking of the centrality of binding instruments in
cooperation, and in this subsection I take this rethinking one step further.
Conventional wisdom holds that the most effective international
commitments are legally binding. Concern with compliance as a legal
matter flows from the existence of binding obligations. Yet many
international agreements are not legally binding. The entire field of "soft-
law" attests to the spectrum of bindingness that has emerged in practice and
the multiplicity of non-binding instruments currently in existence. 184 There
is evidence that non-binding instruments are not merely "failed treaties,"
but may, under some circumstances, be as effective or more effective than
legally-binding treaties. 185  Non-binding instruments have distinctadvantages, ranging from more rapid "entry into force" to greater flexibility
180 See Levy, supra note 170, at 132 ("LRTAP held states publically accountable to
principles they accepted on paper but violated in practice, boosted the power of domestic
proponents of action, and created a multilateral knowledge base supporting the need for
action.").
181 Id. at 77.
182 See supra Part III(C) (discussing liberal international relations theory).
183 For an examination of the form of agreements, see Charles Lipson, Why Are Some
International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT'L ORG. 495 (1991); Abbott & Snidal, supra
note 8 (providing a more focused treatment of the use of international organizations).
184 See Hartmut Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 499
(1999); INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NON-BINDING AccoRDs (ASIL Studies in
Transnational Legal Policy No. 29, Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997); Pierre-Marie Dupuy,
Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 420, 422-
28 (1991); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J.
INT'L L. 413, 414-15 (1983); Oscar Schachter, Editorial Comment, The Twilight
Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296 (1977).
185 See Rautistala & Victor, supra note 109, at 659, 684-89; Brown Weiss, supra note
4, at 1566-70.
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to greater willingness by governments to consider ambitious or
experimental approaches. 186 They also have distinct costs: if law is a tool to
strengthen and signal the depth and credibility of commitment, a non-
binding instrument will not achieve these ends as well as a binding
instrument. Given the high transaction costs associated with negotiating
treaties, 187 however, even a finding that non-binding instruments are, under
certain conditions, equally effective or nearly as effective as treaties is
significant.
One advantage of non-binding instruments is that they may avoid the
lowest-common-denominator problem in regulatory standards. As I argued
in Part I[ of this article, compliance is often simply an artifact of the legal
standard used. This dynamic is particularly important in the international
context. Given that states are the creators of international law and
international treaties an endogenous regulatory strategy, it is perhaps not
surprising that many treaties demand little of their signatories. 18 While
civil actors and interest groups may exert considerable pressure in
negotiations, governments ultimately set the rules and standards of
international treaty law. 189 If governments care about compliance - as they
186 See Raustiala & Victor, supra note 109, at 685; Hillgenberg, supra note 184, at
501. But see Kal Raustiala, Democracy, Sovereignty, and the Slow Pace of International
Negotiations, 8 INT'L ENVT'L. AFF. 3 (1996) (discussing, in the context of international
environmental cooperation, the normative problems that may ensue generally when
international decisions are not subject to the full panoply of domestic approval
structures.; see also JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATrERS 32-33 (1998). These
normative concerns are not limited to non-binding accords and can arise in many
contexts where international decisions with domestic ramifications are not subject to
adequate democratic procedures. While I maintain those concerns, my focus here is
purely on the effectiveness of non-binding accords as instruments of environmental
management, and not on the democratic dilemmas they may raise.
187 The Uruguay Round of the GATT took eight years, for example, while many
international negotiations routinely take several years and extensive diplomatic energy.
See Paul Katzenberger & Annette Kur, TRIPs and Intellectual Property, in FROM GAIT
TO TRIPs - THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS, supra note 57, at 1, 1. In many cases a tremendous amount of time is consumed
in fine-grained debates over "bracketed text" that is driven in part by the legal status of
the commitments under consideration. While the widely held assumption until recently
was that regardless of the intensity of differences in an environmental treaty negotiation,
some agreement, however flawed or incomplete, would result - witness the Kyoto
Protocol; the rejection of the draft Biosafety Protocol in Cartagena in 1999 has
undermined that view (though negotiations were renewed in January 2000 and a new
Protocol successfully emerged). For the comprehensive coverage of the negotiations, see
Earth Negotiations Bulletin (last visited May 13, 2000) www.iisd.ca/linkages/voll2.
188 See supra Part II.
189 On the role of non-governmental actors in international cooperation, see Steve
Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18
MICH. J. INT'L L. 183 (1997); Kal Raustiala, The "Participatory Revolution" in
International Environmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 537 (1997); NGOs, THE
UN, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Thomas G. Weiss & Leon Gordenker eds., 1996).
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appear to in many cases' 90 - they will resist creating standards that are too
challenging for fear they will not be in compliance. In several cases of
environmental cooperation, however, states have appeared more willing to
adopt commitments that are clearer and more ambitious when those
commitments are in non-binding form. What is most significant is that these
non-binding instruments have led to observable, sometimes marked,
changes in behavior, and sometimes these changes in behavior appear
greater than the likely change under a regime with binding rules.
For example, agreements to address marine pollution in the North Sea
have been made in both binding and non-binding form.19 The non-binding
agreements emerged out of a high-level political process aided by scientific
assessment and collective reviews of implementation. 9 2 The non-binding
commitments were far more ambitious than the binding commitments, and
because they were drafted in a clear form - percentage cuts of major
pollutants - they were easily assessed through the review process and
proved fairly effective. 9 3 Over time, the non-binding commitments have
pioneered the path of regulation for the parties, and commitments
undertaken only when non-binding have later been promulgated in binding
form. 94 While the evidence is not robust, non-binding commitments appear
to be most effective when they are linked to well-developed and regularized
systems of implementation review.' 95 In the North Sea case, the
promulgation of non-binding instruments was closely tied to an SIR that
involved technical as well as political input - often at the highest levels.
Non-binding commitments have also produced wider and more
intensive domestic regulatory efforts than likely would have occurred with
a binding agreement. The Nitrogen Oxides Protocol to LRTAP, for
example, called for a freeze on emissions by a set date.19 6 A group of states
went further and agreed to cut emissions by 30%, but made that
190 To be sure, some governments do not care about compliance in some cases. Many
states have signed human rights agreements, for example, with seemingly little intent to
comply. But, to rephrase Louis Henkin's famous aphorism, in most cases and for most
states, governments care about compliance most of the time. See supra text
accompanying note 38.
191 See Jon Birger Skjkrseth, The Making and Implementation of North Sea
Commitments: The Politics of Environmental Participation, in in THE IMPLEMENTATION
AND EFFECTIVENEss OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE, supra note 12, at 327, 327.
192 See Raustiala & Victor, supra note 109, at 685-86.
193 See id.
19 See Skerseth, supra note 191, at 328.
195 See Rautistala & Victor, supra note 109, for a description of cases that support this
assertion; see also Thomas Bernauer & Peter Moser, Reducing Pollution of the River
Rhine: The Influence of International Cooperation, 5 J. ENV'T & DEv. 389 (1996)
(discussing the non-binding "action plan" for the Rhine); Brown Weiss, supra note 4, at
1569 (arguing that the experience with human rights under the Helsinki Final Act also
demonstrates the utility of non-binding accords).
196 See Levy, supra note 170, at 96.
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commitment non-binding. 197  Nonetheless, for the states involved,
emissions were cut more than they likely would have been without the non-
binding target, and detailed case studies suggest that the stricter target
induced meaningful regulatory efforts that probably would not have
occurred in the non-binding target's absence.198 As is clear, these claims are
heavily dependent on counterfactual analysis, but the evidence is
nonetheless suggestive.
Non-binding commitments are likely to be particularly useful when
states are unsure about what they can feasibly implement. When such
"implementation uncertainty" 199 is high - as it often is in environmental
cooperation - the benefits of non-binding commitments are particularly
evident. In such situations, as I have argued, the concern with compliance
leads states to negotiate treaties with unchallenging rules and standards,
with a large margin of error built in. Rather than address uncertainty by
weakening the regulatory framework, non-binding instruments provide
flexibility in the face of uncertain means and costs - perhaps one reason
they are often used for international monetary coordination. 2w
To be sure, flexibility can at times be written into a legally-binding
instrument; the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change, for example, introduces flexibility both by setting a range of target
dates for emissions reductions20' and by employing various forms of
emissions trading and joint implementation.2 2 The Kyoto approach may
197 See SOROOS, supra note 169, at 7.
198 Jorgen Wettestad, Participation in NO, Policy-Making and the Implementation in
the Netherlands, UK, and Norway: Different Approaches but Similar Results?, in THE
IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 12, at 381.
199 See Raustiala & Victor, supra note 109, at 660-63.
200 The "Plaza" and "Louvre" accords on exchange rates, for example, were non-
binding agreements to manipulate and guide exchange rates between the key economic
powers. See YOICHI FUNABASHI, MANAGING THE DOLLAR: FROM THE PLAZA TO THE
LOUVRE 9-10, 177, 240 (1988). Much of international monetary cooperation is governed
by non-binding agreements or tacit cooperation. See generally id. On the international
law of money, see Dominick Salvatore, The International Monetary System: Past,
Present, and Future, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1975 (1994); Joseph Gold, Strengthening the
Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 443 (1983). A
basic introduction to international monetary relations can be found in JOAN E. SPERO &
JEFFREY A. HART, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 31-64 (4th ed.
1990).
201 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 64, arts. 3(1), 3(2). The "commitment period" runs
from 2008-2012 for the industrialized country parties; these parties must show
"demonstrable progress" in achieving their numerical greenhouse gas reduction target
goals by 2005. See id.
202 See, e.g., Richard N. Cooper, Toward a Real Global Warming Treaty, FOR. AFF.,
Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 66, 70-74 (1998). The emissions reductions targets themselves vary
from party to party. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 64, Annex B.
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turn out to be an important model.20 3 However, one lesson of the cases
discussed above is that non-binding instruments coupled with
implementation review processes provide an alternative means of achieving
flexibility, one that does not require the same degree of laborious legal
drafting and hence is likely to be faster and easier to put into place.
Moreover, non-binding instruments may promote the use of clear and
ambitious targets coupled with a focus on regular reviews of performance
- which is useful, as discussed above, for many reasons - rather than the
creation of legal structures that are flexible by virtue of extensive and
sometimes complex rules and exceptions. While the use of a structure of
extensive, complex rules and exceptions can be effective, as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade27 and the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species ("CITES") 20 5 have both shown, non-binding
instruments may be comparably effective and are often simpler.
To realize these virtues, however, the evidence to date suggests that
the parties involved need to carefully review implementation at a political
level high enough to ensure that serious and continuing attention is given to
putting commitments into place. Also, echoing liberal arguments, it may be
the case that non-binding instruments work best when the parties involved
are liberal democracies. Liberal democracies are comfortable with external
scrutiny of implementation and familiar with extensive regulatory
cooperation. 206 The relative advantages of each approach in any given case
will often rest in part on idiosyncratic and contextual factors, though any
general theory of instrument choice will likely embrace the trade-off
between the credibility gains associated with binding instruments and the
flexibility and learning-by-doing gains of non-binding instruments. The
central point in this context is that the paradigm of creating binding rules
and then seeking to achieve compliance with them is not the only possible
route to effective international cooperation. While non-binding instruments
are not a panacea, the evidence suggests that more consideration of their
utility in international cooperation, and of the comparative advantages of
different legal forms generally, is warranted.
V. SOME CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TRIPS
ACCORD
The topic of this symposium - compliance with international
intellectual property agreements - reflects the rising salience of
203 However, the implementation of Kyoto is far off, and there are very daunting
challenges to creating and implementing the rules that will put the Protocol's vaunted
flexibility into place in an administrable and effective manner.
204 On the structure of GATT and the WTO, see TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 72.
205 See Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 3. On the complex rule-and-
exception structure of CITES as promotive of compliance, see Peter H. Sand, Whither
CITES? The Evolution of a Treaty Regime in the Borderland of Trade Environment, EUR.
J. INT'L L. 29 (1997) 29-58. (Dr. Sand is a former Secretary-General of CITES).
206 Victor et al., supra note 12.
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intellectual property in international affairs. Intellectual property is vitally
important in domestic law and increasingly important in international
law.207 The international trade implications of intellectual property
protection are large and growing.208 These trade implications provided the
conceptual link that permitted the incorporation of intellectual property law
into the World Trade Organization - though the history of the negotiations
demonstrates that it was the power of the United States, the fear of
continued "aggressive unilateralism,"209 and the package nature of the
Uruguay Round negotiations that permitted what might have been another
treaty under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization210
to instead become part of the most powerful international organization in
the world today.211 Below I briefly summarize the TRIPs accord and apply
one of the lessons of international environmental law described above-that
of the utility of systems of implementation review-to the international
intellectual property context.
207 This is evidenced by the rise of coursebooks on international intellectual property.
See, e.g., DORIS ESTELLE LONG & ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (2000).
208 Although intellectual property may be traded or embodied in traded goods,
intellectual property protection does not directly or inevitably promote international
trade; as long as the treatment of innovation is non-discriminatory with regard to foreign
innovators, an absence of national protection is indeterminate in its international trade
effects. But as a political matter, the impact for international trade of intellectual
property protection is great.
209 See generally AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990); see also
B6ndicte Callan, Piracy Protection in the Twenty-First Century, in PARTNERS OR
COMPETITORS? THE PROSPECTS FOR U.S.-EUROPEAN COOPERATION ON ASIAN TRADE 158
(Richard H. Steinberg & Bruce Stokes eds., 1999) (containing a list of intellectual
property-related actions by the United States under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act).
210 WIPO, based in Geneva, became a UN agency in 1974 and has been the site of
negotiation of several intellectual property treaties. See MICHAEL BLAKENEY, TRADE
RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 24-26 (1996).
211 Many developing states, suspicious of the merits of intellectual property protection
(particularly patent law), did not welcome its inclusion in the GATT/WTO negotiations.
See RYAN, supra note 3, at 107 ("... developing countries maintained that WIPO, not
the GATT, was the appropriate forum for discussions of intellectual property rights...").
However, the wide scope of the Uruguay Round provided some things that developing
countries did want - such as improved dispute resolution and agriculture - and thus
they accepted TRIPS as part of the broader trade bargain, and also in the hopes that they
would not be subject to the continued threat of unilateral sanctions by the United States.
See id. at 112. On the general efforts of industrialized countries to extend intellectual
property protection globally, see Sell, supra note 3, at 321-32; Callan, supra note 209.
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A. The TRIPS Agreement
The negotiation of the TRIPS agreement has dramatically expanded
the scope and depth of international intellectual property law.212 TRIPS
extends the basic GATT norms of national treatment and most-favored
nation to intellectual property and incorporates minimum standards for
intellectual property protection in the GATT/WTO system for the first
time.2 13 These minimum standards are largely drawn from pre-existing
international intellectual property agreements, in particular the Paris214 and
Berne2 15 Conventions. "Minimum standards" means that the TRIPS accord
is not a harmonization treaty. TRIPS parties are free, as long as they meet
the minimum standards, to determine the appropriate way to do so within
their own national legal systems.216 (These minimum standards are,
however, largely set at the level of the industrialized countries and thus are
not so minimal for many developing countries).217 "Minimum" also means
that parties can, if they desire, offer protections beyond those contained in
TRIPS.
The fact that TRIPS only sets a regulatory floor does not alter its
fundamental importance: TRIPS contains many innovative, significant, and
difficult obligations. For example, TRIPS offers product and process
patents to inventions "in all fields of technology,',218 presumably
incorporating software, transgenic animals and plants, and other
controversial areas of patent scope.219 TRIPS covers copyright, trademark,
212 For extensive overviews of the legal provisions of TRIPS, see FROM GATT TO
TRIPS - THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS, supra note 57 and DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (1998).
213 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the
Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275,
277, 279 (1997); see also LONG & D'AMATO, supra note 207, at 283-412; J.H. Reichman,
From Freeriders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11 (1997); Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets
in the Third World: Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral
Framework, 22 VAND. 1. TRANSNAT'LL. 689, 738-39 (1989).
214 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 25 Stat.
1372, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
215 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
216 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 1; see also Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager,
Compliance with TRIPs: The Emerging World View, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391,
394 (1996).
217 See Otten & Wager, supra note 216, at 396.
218 TRIPS Agreement, art. 27.
219 This extension, however, is bounded by the express right of parties to exclude
patents on grounds of public order or morality. See id. India and the United States have
already feuded over this issue. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S., India, Spar at WTO Meeting on
Need to Bolster Patent Protection of Life Forms, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. 1741 (1999).
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integrated circuits ("maskworks"), industrial designs, and trade secrets.22 °
TRIPS also contains detailed obligations on the domestic structure and
process of intellectual property protection: parties must, inter alia, provide
for judicial review of patent revocations, 22' have civil judicial procedures
that guarantee the right to independent legal counsel,222 and provide for
criminal procedures in cases of counterfeiting and piracy.223 These
requirements radically intrude into traditionally domestic spheres of law
and policy and are one of the most interesting aspects of TRIPS. Perhaps
most significant from a compliance perspective, TRIPS provides access to
the new dispute resolution and enforcement procedures of the WTO, which
have no real analogue in international environmental law, and, unlike most
dispute resolution procedures in international law, are widely used and
appear largely effective.
224
One salient similarity between international intellectual property law
and international environmental law is that both present regulatory
220 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, arts. 9-39; Otten & Wager, supra note 216, at
397-402.
221 See id. art. 32.
222 See id. art. 42.
223 See id. art. 51.
224 The WTO dispute resolution system is often cited as a model for other areas of
international law. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in International
Economic Law - Lessons for Strengthening International Dispute Settlement in Non-
Economic Areas, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 189 (1999). While international tribunals have
proliferated in recent years, most have low or non-existent caseloads. For a survey and
discussion, see Symposium, The Proliferation of International Tribunals: Piecing
Together the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 679 (1999); in particular Cesare P.R.
Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 709, 709-10 (1999) (stating that "since 1989, almost a dozen
international judicial bodies have become active or have been extensively reformed,
compared to only about six or seven previously populating the international scene");
Jonathan I. Charney, The Impact on the International Legal System of the Growth of
International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 697, 701 (1999)
(stating that "...a comparison of the number of cases handled by the [International Court
of Justice] and those handled by the highest courts of states, or even several other
standing international dispute settlement tribunals, shows that the [International Court of
Justice]'s caseload is relatively low.") The formal dispute resolution procedures that are
boilerplate in international environmental agreements have, to my knowledge, never
been invoked, with the possible exception of the recent decision by the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases. See International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (visited May 12, 2000)
http://www.un.orglDepts/los/ITLOS/Order-tuna34.htm. The Convention on the Law of
the Sea, while it has environmental elements, is at the fringes of international
environmental law. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10,
1982, 21 I.L.M. 1288. Nonetheless, this is an important case and perhaps, though I doubt
it, an indicator that formal dispute resolution will be more widely used in the future in
environmental treaties.
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challenges for governments that are not just administrative or cost-based.22
Both are areas in which extensive debate over the nature of the problem and
the preferred nature of solutions exists. TRIPS is also largely about
domestic regulation and regulatory structures rather than border controls.226
This focus on "behind the border" issues is shared by nearly all
environmental treaties.227 The incorporation of such behind the border,
domestic protection provisions into TRIPS may pose challenges for the
WTO dispute resolution system, which was largely designed around the
long collective experience with trade in tangible goods and border measures
under GATT.
As Rochelle Dreyfuss and Andreas Lowenfeld argue, "neither the
[dispute settlement body], nor the TRIPS agreement nor the Berne or Paris
Conventions, provide guidance on how minimum standards.. .will work in
conjunction with an adjudicatory dispute resolution system that is backedS ,,228 t
with enforcement procedures. For example, they ask, is national
legislation that grants copyright protection for software sufficient for
compliance with the minimum standards standard of TRIPS, even if in
practice programs are often found by the national courts to be unprotected
methods of operation? 229 Intellectual property law is new to many WTO
member states and different understandings of its conceptual basis, scope,
and utility co-exist uneasily and will undoubtedly lead to different
approaches to the same minimum standards. The implementation of behind
the border measures is also not likely to be easy,230 particularly when many
states have not embraced intellectual property protection willingly.
Collective understandings among the parties about what TRIPS requires
probably do not exist. 3 The five-year transitional period for developing
countries comes to an end this year, and these countries will become open
225 In addition, both are often characterized by North-South divisions. There are also
very interesting overlaps involved in the genetic resources debate taking place in
numerous international fora. See supra note 3.
226 See RYAN, supra note 3, at 141 ("TRIPs is also an unprecedented initiative of the
industrialized world to strengthen the judicial systems of developing countries.
Implementation of the agreement by third world governments in the late 1990s and
beyond will challenge accepted strategies of economic development, the governments'
capacity to enforce policy, and the effectiveness of the judiciary.").
227 ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE ET AL., ALBERT BRESSAND, AND T. ITO, A VISION FOR THE
WORLD ECONOMY: OPENNESS, DIVERSITY, AND COHESION 22 (1996).
228 Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 213, at 281. "This difference in focus between
TRIPS and the remainder of the GATT means that participants in disputes involving
intellectual property will be moving in largely uncharted waters." Id. at 280. See also
J.H. Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures of the TRIPs Agreement, 37 VA.
J. INT'L L. 335, 336-40 (1997) [hereinafter Reichman, Enforcing Enforcement]
(commenting on Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 213).
229 See Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 213, at 284-85.
230 See, e.g., Raustiala & Victor, supra note 109, at 692.
231 See Sell, supra note 3, at 321-22.
232 See Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 213, at 333.
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to attack through the DSU. 233 Many developing countries are apparently
not on track to have TRIPS fully implemented and are thus quite vulnerable
to a noncompliance complaint.
B. SIRs and TRIPS
One means to address the lacunae in collective understandings that
Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld identify is to consider this and other
jurisprudential issues the WTO dispute settlement bodies may face in
advance. This is the method Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld take, and they present
several scenarios that illustrate the range of problems the WTO faces and
then present some possible solutions for the DSU. 35 Another means is to
consider how the legal resolution of such compliance-related disputes might
be avoided in the first place. The evidence discussed in Part IV above
concerning SIRs suggests one pathway to achieve this.
A chief benefit of SIRs is that they foster collective learning in
regulatory situations where governments often do not know how to get to
where they want to go.236 While many disputes over the scope of
intellectual property protection will no doubt be driven by protectionist -
in the international trade sense - sentiments, some will reflect fundamental
uncertainties over the scope, concepts, and means of intellectual property
protection. Some differences might be discussed, defused and resolved
through a regularized process of review of the domestic implementation of
TRIPS. To be sure, much of the animating force behind the creation of
TRIPS in nations like the United States was the concern with software and
other piracy, a relatively straightforward issue, but even here the TRIPS
accord expressly permits states to determine the appropriate methods of
implementing its provisions within their national legal systems.237 Because
the bounds of this rule are not yet clear, these differences in approach and
conception could lead to many potential disputes. Because TRIPS covers a
wide range of intellectual property fields and doctrines, it is necessarily
scanty on details and on areas of intellectual property law that are new or
emerging. While these are not necessarily the core concerns that motivated
the creation of TRIPS, they are nonetheless within the jurisdiction of TRIPS
and increasingly important in the world economy. Issues such as the rise of
the internet pose real challenges to many received intellectual property
doctrines, and as one commentator has noted, "the TRIPs initiative did not
233 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 65. The general transitional period came
to an end January 1 2000. (For least-developed states, the transitional period ends in
2006). See id. art 66. Certain areas of the law, such as patent protection for
pharmaceuticals, are subject to a longer transition period. See id. art. 65.
234 See J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation
with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 441 (2000) [hereinafter
Reichman, TRIPS Agreement Comes ofAge].
235 See Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 213, at 281-332.
236 Cf. Victor et al., supra note 12, at 16-20.
237 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 1.
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address the policy challenges imposed on intellectual property law by
information and communication technologies that are revolutionizing
business activity, government service, and social life. 23' Different states
will have different views on how to best address these challenges. SIRs can
foster collective learning and the sharing of ideas as parties begin to grapple
with the complexities of creating or modifying their intellectual property
systems.239
Regularized implementation review, because it permits ongoing but
informal negotiation to continue, may also encourage potential disputants to
work out differences politically rather than judicially. While some
observers might consider this problematic - judicial solutions, after all,
often cast useful shadows that can shape expectations and influence the
terms of future agreements reached privately - judicial solutions can also
be quite costly in a political and politicized context like that of world trade.
240 As the December 1999 events in Seattle demonstrated, there is
significant resentment in many quarters against the WTO, with the dispute
resolution process a central target.241 Moreover, as the continuing French
ban of British beef demonstrates, the politics of economic liberalization can
be intense enough to override judicial solutions even when the relevant
dispute system, in that case the European Union's, is far more adequately
legitimated than the WTO's.242 These experiences suggest caution in the
use of contentious dispute resolution as a means to determine and induce an
"acceptable level of compliance 243 with TRIPS and highlight the merits of
the extensive use of a flexible, less judicialized approach, such as that
embodied in a well-developed, regular process of implementation review.
244
238 RYAN, supra note 3, at 199; see also Callan, supra note 209, at 148-149.
239 Not only structural and administrative issues but core conceptual divisions, such as
the idea-expression dichotomy, are likely to be problematic for states that are newcomers
to intellectual property law. Even in mature intellectual property systems these
conceptual divisions are continuing sources of controversy. See, e.g., Jon 0. Newman,
New Lyrics for an Old Melody: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in the Computer Age, 17
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 691 (1999).
240 This view has general support in the WTO system as well as specific support in the
context of TRIPS. See Otten & Wager, supra note 216, at 411 (stating that the attitude of
the TRIPS Council is to resolve differences diplomatically whenever possible).
241 See Same Howe Verhovek & Steven Greenhouse, National Guard is Called to
Quell Trade-Talk Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at Al.
242 See, e.g., David Woodruff & Brandon Mitchener, France's Continuing Blockage of
British Beef Gives European Union a Familiar Bone to Pick, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 1999,
at A19.
243 See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 17-20 (explaining that there is no single
acceptable level of compliance and discussing the difficulty of determining what is
acceptable).
244 The view that use of the DSU to pursue TRIPS claims raises many problems is not
unorthodox. See, e.g., Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 213, at 332-33; Judith H.
Bello, Some Practical Observations About WTO Settlement of Intellectual Property
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Another argument in favor of an intensive process of implementation
review of TRIPS is that an SIR may be more effective in resolving conflicts
than an approach based purely on the enforcement of compliance through
the DSU. In other words, an SIR may help resolve conflicts as well as avoid
them. The DSU jurisprudence to date on TRIPS suggests, as J.H. Reichman
has argued in his article in this symposium series, that violations of TRIPS
will likely have to be clear, if not flagrant, to be cognizable by the DSU.245
If true, many important intellectual property issues will not be justiciable
via the DSU even should select parties wish to pursue a legal claim.
Implementation review, not bound by doctrinal or precedential rules, can
engage issues that may be difficult to reach through the DSU. While this
may not always produce compliance per se, it will help the parties come to
accord on what TRIPS really demands, help promote full, mutually-
satisfactory implementation of its provisions, and, over time, may produce a
more effective TRIPS.2 46
C. The TRIPS Council
The drafters of TRIPS anticipated the approach recommended here.
Implementation review in general is not new to the WTO system: the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism, which examines member states' general trade
policies in depth, has been operating in some form for over a decade. 47
The TRIPS agreement in turn created a specialized TRIPS Council charged
Disputes, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 357 (1997); Reichman, Enforcing Enforcement, supra note
228.
245 See Reichman, TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age, supra note 234, at 448 (citing
Report of the Appellate Body, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, Bernan's Annotated Trade Rep., vol.
4, at 249 (Dec. 19, 1997)); Reichman, Enforcing Enforcement, supra note 228, at 339-40.
The India Patents case is analyzed in David K. Tomar, A Look into the WTO
Pharmaceutical Patent Dispute Between the United States and India, 17 Wis. INT'L L.J.
579 (1999).
246 A central barrier to this process is widespread discord on what an effective TRIPS
in fact looks like: many states view the merits of U.S.-style intellectual property law
dubiously and there is widespread disagreement about the appropriate shape and scope of
many TRIPS provisions. See generally Reichman, TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age,
supra note 234 at 454 (discussing this widespread disagreement).
247 The Trade Policy Review Mechanism was launched in 1989. See CHAYES &
CHAYES, supra note 5, at 390 n.61 (citing Functioning of the GATT System, Apr. 12,
1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 403 (1990)); KEESING, supra note 139; WTO,
Overseeing National Trade Policies: The TPRM (last updated Jan. 22, 2000)
http://www.wto.org/wto/reviews/reviews.htm. As Keesing writes, "The [TPRM] is a
little-known but important activity of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Its purpose
is to strengthen observance of WTO commitments and promote trade liberalization by
providing all member countries -with current and objective information about the trade
policies and practices of each member individually and by establishing a forum within
which members can question one another's policies and practices in a nonconfrontational
manner." KEESING, supra note 139, at 1.
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with monitoring the implementation and operation of the accord.2 48 The
Council's primary mandate is to "monitor the operation of this Agreement
[TRIPS] and, in particular, Members' compliance with their obligations
hereunder." 249 The TRIPS Council meets roughly five times a year, and is
required to submit an annual report to the WTO's General Council.2 0 In
particular, it receives notifications of member states' implementing
legislation251 and conducts reviews of members' national TRIPS-related
legislation. 2 In past years it has also, inter alia, discussed draft model
legislation drawn up by the World Customs Organization regarding border
enforcement obligations;253 established formal contacts with the World
Intellectual Property Organization and organized workshops with the
Organization on technical cooperation;254 reviewed the provisions within
TRIPS on geographical indications (such as wine appellations);255
examined the implications for TRIPS of electronic commerce by request of
the WTO General Council;256 and considered the extension of the current
moratorium on "non-violation" disputes under TRIPSY 7 Thus TRIPS has a
248 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 68.
249 See id. In addition, the Council is to "afford Members the opportunity of consulting
on matters relating to [TRIPS]" and "provide any assistance requested by [Members] in
the context of dispute settlement procedures." Id.
250 See, e.g., Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Annual
Report (1999) of the Council for TRIPS, IP/C/19 (Oct. 22, 1999), available at World
Trade Organization (visited Apr. 20, 2000) www.wto.org [hereinafter Annual Report
(1999)]. The basic structure is four tiers: the Ministerial Conference; the General
Council; the Council for TRIPS (and parallel councils for trade in goods and in services);
and specialized committees.
251 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 63(2).
252 See id. art. 68. For example, in 1997 the Council reviewed the legislation of 30
members in the areas of trademarks, geographical indications and industrial designs. See
Annual Report (1997) of the Council for TRIPs (IP/C/12), 28 November 1997, Part III,
at www.wto.org.
253 See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Minutes of
Meeting, IP/C/M/1 (Apr. 25, 1995), available at World Trade Organization (visited May
13, 2000) http://www.wto.org.
254 See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Report
(1996) of the Council for TRIPS, IP/C/8 (Nov. 6, 1996), U 20-25, available at World
Trade Organization (visited Apr. 20, 2000) http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Annual
Report (1996).
255 See, e.g., Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Annual
Report (1997) of the Council for TRIPS, IP/C/12 (Nov. 28, 1997), available at World
Trade Organization (visited Apr. 20, 2000) www.wto.org [hereinafter Annual Report
(1997)].
256 See Annual Report (1999), supra note 250.
257 See Daniel Pruzin, EU and Cuba Attack U.S. Law Denying Trademark Holder
Protections, 17 INT'L TRADE REP. 726, 727 (1999) (stating that under GATT Article
XXIII(l), "a WTO member may commence dispute settlement proceedings against any
measure that it believes is directly or indirectly impairing its trading rights, regardless of
whether the measure actually conflicts with WTO rules").
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SIR. My goal here is to illustrate how this SIR has thus far, and might in
the future, work to improve the effectiveness of TRIPS, and to suggest that
greater reliance on the TRIPS Council (rather than on the WTO dispute
settlement process) has many potential advantages.
Review of national laws and regulations is, along with discussion of
issues left unresolved within the TRIPS Agreement, 258 the core of the
TRIPS Council's work.259 This review helps identify problems with the
implementation of TRIPs and creates a dialogue that can foster more
thorough implementation. The TRIPS Council has established a schedule
for the review of national legislation and a set of procedures: the Council
issues written questions in advance of the review meeting, to which
members may reply in writing, and during the meeting itself there are
follow-up questions and replies.260 States under review provide a brief
overview of their national TRIPS-related legislation and of the changes, if
any, implemented to bring that legislation into compliance with TRIPS.26l
Council members may then query the state under review about its
legislation. Sometimes they do so pointedly; for example, in the January
1999 meeting, during a review of Mongolia, the representative of the
European Communities "expressed serious concerns with regard to the
legislation of Mongolia in the area of enforcement and said that, in the view
of his delegation, there was a serious violation of the WTO Protocol... 262
At other times, the inquiry is quite specific and provides an opportunity for
WTO member states to receive tutorials in the details of national
intellectual property law. In a review of U.S. copyright law, for example,
Australia asked the U.S. government to "[pilease explain, having regard to
the decisions in Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc., and Princeton
University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc. and any similar
cases whether and how the U.S. law offair use complies with Article 9(2) of
the Berne Convention and Article 13 of TRIPs.''263 Interactions like these
258 See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement art. 23(4) (providing that the TRIPS Council must
undertake negotiations on the creation of a multilateral register of geographical
indications for wine and spirits); see also Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Minutes of Meeting, IP/C/M/21 (Jan. 22, 1999) [hereinafter
TRIPS Council Minutes of Jan. 22, 1999], available at World Trade Organization
(visited Apr. 20, 2000) http://www.wto.org.
259 Some analysts believe, however, that it should be doing more monitoring and
dispute settlement. See, e.g., GERVAIS, supra note 212, at 27-28.
260 See Annual Report (1996), supra note 254, 4-25.
261 See, e.g., TRIPS Council Minutes of Jan. 22, 1999, supra note 258, 10-21.
262 Id. 12.
263 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Review of
Legislation on Copyright and Related Rights: United States, IP/Q/USA/1 (Oct. 30, 1996)
II(1), available at World Trade Organization (visited Apr. 20, 2000) http://www.wto.org.
The U.S. response was, in part, that in Sega, "the court applied the doctrine of fair use to
the specific facts of the case before it... courts are required to balance several factors...
This narrow holding based on the particular facts . . .is a defensible judgment for the
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are useful because they inform other member states about substantive
national law, signal potential areas of conflict and dispute, alert the queried
member states to weaknesses of their national laws vis-h-vis TRIPS, and
begin to create the norms and standards that will guide both the work of the
TRIPS Council and subsequent disputes and settlements.
Member states have also begun to raise issues about TRIPS
implementation and compliance by other members outside the context of
the formal review process. In 1999, questions were raised in TRIPS Council
meetings about U.S. compliance with TRIPS provisions regarding
trademarks and trade names, 64 and Austrian compliance with provisions
regarding geographical indications.265 This was the first time such questions
266
appeared in the Council's Annual Reports. In the U.S. case, Cuba, the
complaining party, used the TRIPS Council as a forum for confronting the
United States on the issue and sought explanations from U.S.
representatives.267 In the Austrian case, after verbal sparring in the Council
the parties are now seeking a bilateral solution.268 While the evidence is
preliminary, it appears that the TRIPS Council may be following a similar
trajectory to that of the Montreal Protocol Implementation Committee:
beginning with very general issues of implementation and, as parties grow
more comfortable with the process of national review, increasing the degree
of focus on discrete issues of national compliance and on clarifying and
interpreting TRIPS obligations.269
purposes of the exceptions permitted under [TRIPS]." Id. There are many such detailed
questions in the records of the Council.
264 The issue involves the trademark "Havana Club" for rum and a U.S. court's
invalidation of the Cuban trademark in the United States. See Daniel Pruzin, EU Seeks
WTO Talks with U.S. on Cuba Trademark Provisions, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. 1189 (1999).
The mark is partially owned by the French company Pemod Ricard. See id.; see also EU
and Cuba Attack U.S. Law Denying Trademark Holder Protections, supra note 257, at
726; A Rum Affair, ECONOMIST, July 10, 1999, at 70.
265 See Tom Hundley, Horse's Name Breeds Controversy: Slovenia Seeks Exclusive
Rights to 'Lippizaner' as Symbol, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 7. 2000, at 1. The issue involves the
rights to the geographical indication of Lipizzaner, currently used to refer to the horses
of the Viennese "Spanish Riding School." Slovenia, which contains the town for which
the horses are named, seeks to have the indication recognized, much like Champagne is
recognized for specific sparkling wines. Austria, for whom the horses are a major tourist
attraction, argues that horses are known by their breeds and not their place of origin. See
id.
266 See Annual Report (1999), supra note 250.
267 See EU and Cuba Attack U.S. Law Denying Trademark Holder Protections, supra
note 257, at 726.
268 See U.S., India Spar on Need to Bolster Patent Protection of Life Forms, supra
note 219, at 1742.
269 See supra text accompanying notes 146-68. Of course, the TRIPS Council cannot
formally interpret the provisions of TRIPS - only the parties can do so - but in
practice it will likely have an important interpretive role.
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It is important to underscore that by itself an SIR like the TRIPS
Council may not be enough to secure an effective treaty process. The
experience of the Montreal Protocol Non-Compliance Procedure, for
example, suggests that having some kind of powerful sanction in the
background of the process is likely an important element in maximizing the
utility of an SIR.27° In that context, the stick was the linkage to desired
implementation-related funding by external but linked institutions such as
the Global Environment Facility.2 In the context of TRIPS, of course, the
existence of powerful sanctions to back up an SIR process is not at issue:
the DSU provides one of the most effective sticks in international law. The
challenge is instead to avoid reaching for this stick too often - to avoid an
overly litigious focus on securing compliance through coercion and
contentious dispute settlement, to the detriment of the broader cooperative
process.
D. Effectively Implementing TRIPS
TRIPS, more so than most international agreements, contains complex
obligations that relate to core domestic structures (such as the nature and
scope of judicial processes), thorny conceptual distinctions (such as the
idea-expression dichotomy), and contentious social issues (such as the
scope of patents for life forms). As two commentators close to the scene
have argued, "[i]t is all too clear that the TRIPS Agreement does not solve
all problems in the area of international relations regarding intellectual
property matters. By the very nature of [intellectual property], these
problems are constantly changing. 272 TRIPS is part of the WTO and
therefore part of the WTO DSU, a very powerful judicialized approach to
compliance with international obligations. This combination is volatile and
may work to the detriment of both TRIPS and the dispute settlement
process. Given the preceding factors, the state of intellectual property
protection in many developing countries, and the ambiguities in and often
vagueness of TRIPS, a purely or even largely contentious approach to the
pursuit of compliance may produce several undesirable effects. These
include serious political discontent with ramifications for the broader
international trade agenda, backsliding in TRIPS implementation in ways
that are unreachable via the DSU, delegitimation of the DSU itself, and
negative spillovers in parallel World Intellectual Property Organization
processes.
The international environmental experience, as well as the experience
of the WTO, OECD and other organizations, suggests that intensive
270 See Raustiala & Victor, supra note 109, at 683-84. It is of course possible that an
SIR, performance-based approach and a contentious dispute resolution-based approach
are not fully compatible, in that the political fallout from litigation may make more
cooperative approaches difficult to engage in. The interaction between managerial and
enforcement approaches is an interesting area for further research.
27' See id. at 683.
272 Otten & Wager, supra note 216, at 413.
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implementation review performed in a spirit of collective enterprise can
produce positive results. This is particularly true in complex situations
exhibiting high levels of implementation uncertainty. Noncompliance
procedures like that of the Montreal Protocol can also address discrete
compliance problems in detail and productively while avoiding the need for
formal dispute settlement. While there are many differences between
international environmental law and international intellectual property law,
I have drawn on the claims and cases in Part IV of this article to suggest the
utility of an SIR-centered approach to TRIPs effectiveness. Greater
attention to and use of implementation review and the TRIPS Council,
backed by the threat of formal dispute resolution, and perhaps even moves
toward a quasi-noncompliance procedure within TRIPS, is more likely to
yield an implemented, effective TRIPS than is an aggressive focus on
compliance achieved through contentious judicial solutions. At the very
least, such an approach deserves serious attention, especially in years to
come as the developing member states of the WTO become vulnerable to
TRIPS-related compliance challenges under the DSU.
VI. CONCLUSION
Compliance with international regulatory treaties is an important goal.
However, this article has made the case that looking beyond compliance to
the evaluation of effectiveness, particularly in the context of international
law, yields many benefits. Legal scholarship's prevailing focus on
compliance often obscures these benefits. Only by understanding the limits
of compliance, and how compliance and effectiveness interact, can we
move toward both richer, deeper analysis and more productive, effective
international law.
As the literature on international environmental cooperation amply
illustrates, many international agreements have their greatest influence not
simply (or even mainly) as compendia of enforceable rules about behavior.
International law can influence behavior through a number of behavioral
pathways. Modification of the costs and benefits of particular actions to
induce compliance with binding rules is a familiar path, but not the only
path - as many lawyers are no doubt aware. Treaties and regimes can,
inter alia, enhance the evolution of cooperation by providing frameworks
within which information is dispersed, transparency fostered, and
transaction costs lowered; promote collective learning about the nature of
shared problems and the costs and benefits of various solutions; signal the
credibility of commitments to other governments and to private actors;
foster the reevaluation of those problems and solutions over time; legitimize
particular decisions and policies and delegitimize others; create new market
conditions and foster innovation; and empower some interest groups while
disempowering others.
While compliance or noncompliance is not wholly irrelevant to the
operation of these causal pathways, it is only a small part of the overall
picture. As the examples and arguments above also illustrate, the pursuit of
compliance can sometimes be counterproductive to the achievement of
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effectiveness. Only through a behavioral approach to the operation of
international law, one that is grounded in theories of international relations
and is cognizant of these myriad modes of influence and their relation to
traditional concerns such as compliance, can we begin to appreciate
international law's actual role in structuring and organizing state behavior.
This is critical if the international community is to create legal rules that
effectively achieve their purposes.
